A New Era for the Big 8? Evidence on the Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Type by Cassell, Cory A.
  
 
 
A NEW ERA FOR THE BIG 8? EVIDENCE ON THE ASSOCIATION  
BETWEEN EARNINGS QUALITY AND AUDIT FIRM TYPE 
 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
CORY ALAN CASSELL  
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
May 2009 
 
 
Major Subject: Accounting 
  
 
 
A NEW ERA FOR THE BIG 8? EVIDENCE ON THE ASSOCIATION 
BETWEEN EARNINGS QUALITY AND AUDIT FIRM TYPE 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
CORY ALAN CASSELL  
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Approved by: 
Chair of Committee,  Thomas C. Omer 
Committee Members, Gary A. Giroux 
 H. Alan Love 
 Michael S. Wilkins 
Head of Department, James J. Benjamin 
 
May 2009 
 
Major Subject: Accounting 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
A New Era for the Big 8? Evidence on the Association Between Earnings Quality and 
Audit Firm Type. (May 2009) 
Cory Alan Cassell, B.S., Trinity University; M.S., Trinity University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Thomas C. Omer 
 
 I examine the association between earnings quality and audit firm type using a 
three-tiered audit firm classification scheme which allows for an explicit examination of 
the quality of Second-Tier audited earnings. My tests are motivated by the lack of 
competition in the market for audit services, theoretical arguments which suggest a 
positive association between audit firm size and audit quality, evidence pointing to the 
rapid post-Andersen growth in Second-Tier audit practices, and the lack of empirical 
research that fully differentiates audit firm type.  
My results indicate that the post-Andersen growth of Second-Tier audit firms 
coincides with improved Second-Tier audit quality, relative to the other audit firm types 
(Big N and other non-Big N). Specifically, the results indicate that Second-Tier client 
earnings quality was not distinct from that of other non-Big N clients in the pre-
Andersen period. However, in the post-Andersen period, the results indicate that 
Second-Tier client earnings quality was higher than that of other non-Big N clients. 
Moreover, the post-Andersen results provide partial evidence suggesting that there is no 
 iv 
difference in Second-Tier and Big N client earnings quality and, thus, lend some 
credence to the notion of a new era for the Big 8.  
These results convey important information to market participants (e.g., 
investors, underwriters, analysts, etc.) who wish to assess the extent to which financial 
statements are likely to be free from opportunistic managerial manipulation, to clients 
that are contemplating switching to a Second-Tier audit firm, to government agencies 
who have expressed concern over the state of competition in the market for audit 
services, and to those who have promoted the use of Second-Tier audit firms in the wake 
of SOX-related resource constraints.  
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Omer, and my committee 
members, Dr. Giroux, Dr. Love, and Dr. Wilkins, for their guidance and support 
throughout the course of this research. Thanks also go to my friends and colleagues and 
the department faculty and staff for making my time at Texas A&M University a great 
experience. Finally, thanks to my wife and to my parents for their encouragement, 
support, and love. 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
              Page 
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................  iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................  v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................  vi 
CHAPTER 
 I INTRODUCTION ................................................................................   1 
 
 II BACKGROUND ..................................................................................  7 
   Accounting Accruals and Earnings Quality ...................................  7 
   Auditor Size and Audit Quality ......................................................  9 
   Second-Tier Audit Firms ................................................................  12 
III EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY ........................................................      17 
 
  Discretionary Accruals ...................................................................      17 
  Accruals Quality .............................................................................      21 
              Likelihood of Manipulation ...........................................................   23                            
                                 Controls for Potential Selection Bias .............................................  26 
 IV DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS ................................................  28 
                        
     Evidence on the Growth of Second-Tier Audit Firms ...................       28 
  Discretionary Accruals ...................................................................      30 
  Accruals Quality .............................................................................      44 
              Likelihood of Manipulation ...........................................................      52                            
       
 V        CONCLUSION .....................................................................................      56 
 
REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................  59 
 
APPENDIX A ...........................................................................................................  64 
APPENDIX B ...........................................................................................................  70 
 vii 
   Page 
VITA .........................................................................................................................  127 
 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was passed in the wake of corporate 
scandals at Enron, Worldcom, and others. The scandals led to the demise of Arthur 
Andersen and a reduction in the number of the largest auditing firms from five to four, 
raising concerns about auditor choice, price, quality, and concentration. The United 
States General Accounting Office (GAO)
1
 examined these concerns in a SOX mandated 
study entitled Public Accounting Firms: Mandated Study on Consolidation and 
Competition. The GAO report, released in July of 2003, stated,    
 GAO found that smaller accounting firms faced significant barriers to entry – 
including lack of staff, industry and technical expertise, capital formation, global 
reach, and reputation – into the large public company audit market. As a result, 
market forces are not likely to result in the expansion of the current Big 4. 
Furthermore, certain factors and conditions could cause a further reduction in the 
number of major accounting firms (GAO 2003). 
 
 SOX exacerbated competition and concentration concerns by prohibiting clients 
from engaging their auditor to perform certain types of non-audit services.
2
 In a 2005 
speech, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox characterized the current situation as follows,  
The fact that so few firms are available to perform such a critical role in the 
capital formation process has been the subject of discussion for some time now. 
It isn‟t just that a large public company seeking auditing services has only four 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
1
 The General Accounting Office was renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004. 
2
 The 2003 GAO report provides an example of the impact of the SOX mandated prohibition on certain 
types of non-audit services on competition in the market for audit services.  The report describes a 
multinational petroleum company currently using a Big N firm for auditing and outsourcing its internal 
audit function to another Big N firm.  If this company wished to change auditors, it would be left with only 
two Big N audit firms from which to choose, assuming the remaining two Big N audit firms have a local 
and sufficiently staffed office to perform the audit work (GAO 2003).   
 
2 
firms from which to choose. In some cases, because of geographic demands or 
industry specialization, a company may even have only one realistic choice. In 
other cases, because of auditor-independence rules, a company that uses one or 
more of the Big Four for non-audit services may find itself in a position where it 
simply can‟t consider changing auditors (Cox, 2005). 
 
Concerns about the lack of competition in the market for audit services have been 
expressed by various other stakeholders including the U.S. Treasury Department‟s 
Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession, audit clients, and audit firm executives, 
among others (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2008). According to a 2008 GAO 
survey, about 60% of large (Fortune 1000) firms and 50% of midsize firms view the 
level of audit market competition as inadequate (GAO 2008).  
In this paper, I perform tests to examine the characteristics of a group of audit 
firms that appear to be best situated to alleviate some of the concerns described above. 
Specifically, a distinct group of national audit firms (e.g., BDO Seidman, Grant 
Thornton) has emerged in the wake of Andersen‟s collapse and the implementation of 
SOX, and anecdotal evidence suggests that these audit firms (hereafter, Second-Tier) 
have been successful in competing for former Big N clients (Byrnes 2005; Gullapalli 
2005; GAO 2006).
3
 Moreover, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) has encouraged the use of Second-Tier audit firms as an alternative to Big N 
audit firms in light of SOX-related resource constraints faced by the Big N audit firms.
4
 
                                                 
3
 The term Big N refers to the Big 5 audit firms (Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers) and their predecessors (Arthur Young, Coopers & Lybrand, 
Deloitte, Haskins, & Sells, and Touche Ross) prior to Andersen‟s collapse, and to the surviving Big 4 
audit firms thereafter.  The term Second-Tier refers to Grant Thornton, BDO Seidman, the Crowe Group, 
and McGladrey and Pullen as discussed later in the paper.   
4
 Kayla Gillan of the PCAOB commented, “I urge Audit Committees to challenge the assumption that 
every company must use a Big 4 firm, or risk being perceived as somehow of lesser worth.  Even if a 
company is very large, with a very complex financial structure and decentralized operations, I suggest that 
 
3 
The post-Andersen/SOX growth of Second-Tier audit firms has been persistent 
with Second-Tier revenue growth exceeding that for Big N audit firms in each year since 
2003. Moreover, the difference between Second-Tier and Big N revenue growth has 
increased in every year since 2004 (Public Accounting Report 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). 
Second-Tier audit firm growth has received extensive press coverage with some 
suggesting that Second-Tier audit firms have joined the Big 4 to form a new era of the 
Big Eight. Among these, Robert Kueppers (deputy CEO of Deloitte and Touche) stated, 
“We are sort of back to being the Big Eight again. The eight largest firms are working 
together to have a voice” (O‟Sullivan 2007). 
 Despite the rapid growth of Second-Tier audit practices, relatively little research 
has been performed to examine Second-Tier audit quality. To date, most research 
examining the association between various proxies for real and/or perceived audit 
quality and auditor size uses a dichotomous classification scheme for the variable of 
interest (i.e., Big N versus non-Big N) resulting in Second-Tier audit firms being 
grouped together with other non-Big N audit firms. I extend prior research examining 
the association between audit quality and audit firm size by employing a three-tiered 
audit firm classification scheme which allows for an explicit assessment of Second-Tier 
audit quality. Specifically, I perform tests to assess the relative quality of Big N, Second-
Tier, and other non-Big N audits in the years before and after Andersen‟s collapse and 
posit that the gap between Big N and Second-Tier (Second-Tier and other non-Big N) 
                                                                                                                                                
the Audit Committee should also consider the so-called „second tier‟ of audit firms.  I dislike using that 
term because it implies that the firms are secondary in quality – which I strongly believe is false…” (Grant 
Thornton 2006). 
 
4 
audit quality may have decreased (increased) post-Andersen because the post-Andersen 
growth in Second-Tier audit firm client portfolios may have altered the economic 
incentives faced by Second-Tier audit firms (e.g., at-risk economic rents that are larger 
in magnitude, increased litigation exposure, etc.), improved their ability to attract and 
train specialized personnel, or altered the characteristics of their client base.  
 To investigate this issue, I examine the association between audit quality and 
audit firm type using measures of reported earnings quality.
5
 In the context of my study, 
earnings quality can be defined as the extent to which earnings are free from 
opportunistic managerial manipulation. I perform tests using three proxies from the prior 
literature to capture the magnitude and/or direction of opportunistic managerial 
manipulation. The earnings quality proxies include: discretionary accruals, estimated 
using a performance adjusted version of the modified-Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow 
et al. 1995; Kothari et al. 2005); accruals quality, estimated using a modified version of 
the Dechow and Dichev model (Dechow and Dichev 2002; McNichols 2002); and an 
estimate of the probability of material accounting manipulation, estimated using the F-
Score model in Dechow et al. (2008). I use a pre- versus post-Andersen design, where 
                                                 
5
 Audit quality is inherently unobservable.  Prior research has examined various observable audit 
outcomes (e.g., going concern reporting accuracy, frequency of financial statement restatements, earnings 
quality metrics, etc.) to make inferences about audit quality.  Following this line of research, I examine 
three alternative earnings quality metrics to make inferences about pre- to post-Andersen changes in 
Second-Tier audit quality.  Throughout the remainder of the paper, I use the terms audit quality and 
earnings quality interchangeably to refer to the same underlying and unobservable construct of audit 
quality.   
 
5 
the pre-Andersen period is fiscal years 1988 through 2000, and the post-Andersen period 
is fiscal years 2001 through 2006.
6
     
 My results on the association between audit quality and audit firm type indicate 
that the post-Andersen growth of the Second-Tier audit practices coincides with an 
improvement in Second-Tier audit quality, relative to the other audit firm types (Big N 
and other non-Big N). Specifically, I document a pre- to post-Andersen improvement in 
Second-Tier client earnings quality, relative to the other audit firm types (Big N and 
other non-Big N). Using the two accruals-based earnings quality proxies, the results 
indicate that Second-Tier client earnings quality was generally not distinct from that of 
other non-Big N clients in the pre-Andersen period. However, in the post-Andersen 
period, the results indicate that Second-Tier client earnings quality was higher than that 
of other non-Big N clients.   Additionally, the post-Andersen period results provide some 
evidence suggesting that Second-Tier client earnings quality was comparable to Big N 
client earnings quality. Results from tests using the F-Score as the earnings quality proxy 
yield mixed results. Specifically, univariate tests and portfolio analyses generally 
suggest a pre- to post-Andersen decrease in the probability of material accounting 
manipulation for Second-Tier clients. However, the significance of these changes varies 
depending on the sample being examined and the tests performed.   
 This study makes three contributions to the literature. First, because I examine 
the association between audit quality and audit firm type using an audit firm partition 
                                                 
6
 My predictions about changes in the relative quality of Second-Tier audited earnings are not based on a 
specific event (e.g., the collapse of Arthur Andersen or the implementation of SOX) but rather on a series 
of events which enabled Second-Tier audit firms to grow their practices over time.  Thus, my tests 
examine the average improvement in the quality of Second-Tier audited earnings in the years after 
Andersen‟s collapse, relative to the years preceding Andersen‟s collapse.   
 
6 
that distinguishes between Second-Tier and other non-Big N audit firms, the results 
provide preliminary evidence about a group of audit firms who have received relatively 
little attention by researchers to date. This evidence is important because the post-
Andersen growth of Second-Tier audit practices suggests that these firms may be best 
situated to help alleviate concerns about the potential for limited competition in the 
market for audit services. Second, because the results indicate a difference in earnings 
quality between Second-Tier clients and other non-Big N clients and potentially little 
difference in earnings quality between Second-Tier clients and Big N clients post-
Andersen, future investigations of earnings quality related issues should consider a 
trichotomous design . Finally, because my results suggest that Second-Tier client 
earnings are of higher quality than that of other non-Big N clients and, in some 
instances, comparable to that of Big N clients, the results provide support for efforts by 
government agencies to promote the use of Second-Tier audit firms as an alternative to a 
Big N audit.  
The next chapter provides background information on the role of accruals, 
earnings quality, the association between auditor size and audit quality, and Second-Tier 
audit firms. I discuss the empirical methodology, including the earnings quality proxies 
and model development, in Chapter III. Chapter IV provides a description of the data 
used, primary empirical results, and sensitivity analyses performed for each of the 
earnings quality proxies. The final chapter concludes. 
 
7 
CHAPTER II 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
Accounting Accruals and Earnings Quality 
 Accounting earnings is equal to the sum of operating cash flows and accounting 
accruals and provides a summary measure of firm performance. Prior research has 
shown that accrual-based earnings provide a superior measure of firm performance, 
relative to cash flows alone (Dechow 1994; Subramanyam 1996). This is because 
accounting accruals help to mitigate timing and matching problems which make cash 
flows a noisy measure of firm performance. However, because the accrual process 
requires managers to make subjective, and often complex, estimates of future outcomes, 
financial statements may contain material intentional or unintentional errors stemming 
from the accrual estimation process.  
Accrual-related managerial manipulation can arise because of the complex and 
subjective nature of the accrual estimation process coupled with incentives which could 
entice managers to over or understate the financial results of the firm. Managers are 
faced with numerous incentives to manipulate earnings. Because managers‟ 
compensation is often linked to firm performance through employment contracts and the 
value of managers‟ stock and stock-option holdings depend on stock price (which 
depends on firm performance), manager wealth is closely tied to the performance of the 
firm. Prior research indicates that managers do, in fact, make opportunistic reporting 
 
8 
decisions in an attempt to maximize personal wealth.
7
 However, the ability of managers 
to manipulate earnings is constrained by a number of factors. These factors include 
historical accounting decisions which limit managers‟ ability to exercise future 
discretion (Barton and Simko 2002), and the firm‟s external auditor (Becker et al. 1998), 
among others. As discussed below, the extent to which opportunistic reporting decisions 
survive the audit process to be presented in the financial statements is expected to vary 
with the quality of the external auditor.  
 In this study, I examine the association between earnings quality and audit firm 
type. In the context of my study, earnings quality can be defined as the extent to which 
reported earnings contain opportunistic managerial manipulation of the accrual 
estimation process. I perform tests using two accruals-based proxies used in prior 
literature to capture the magnitude and/or direction of opportunistic managerial 
manipulation. The proxies include an estimate of the discretionary component of total 
accruals based on the modified Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et 
al. 2005) and an estimate of accruals quality based on a modified version of the Dechow 
and Dichev model (Dechow and Dichev 2002; McNichols 2002).  
Prior research provides support for the use of accruals-based earnings quality 
metrics as suitable surrogates for audit quality. Specifically, prior research documents an 
association between discretionary accruals estimates and audit outcomes such as auditor 
litigation, opinion qualifications, and auditor changes. For example, Heninger (2001) 
provides evidence that discretionary accruals are positively associated with the risk of 
                                                 
7
 For example, Efendi et al. 2006 find that the likelihood of a financial statement restatement increases 
significantly when the CEO has sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options.  
 
9 
litigation. Prior research also documents a positive association between discretionary 
accruals estimates and the issuance of qualified audit opinions (Bartov et al. 2000), audit 
failures (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002), and auditor changes (DeFond and 
Subramanyam 1998).  
The third, and final, earnings quality proxy examined in this study is based on the 
recent work of Dechow et al. (2008). Dechow et al. (2008) model the likelihood of 
material accounting manipulation using a large sample of firms that have allegedly 
manipulated their financial statements. Material accounting manipulation is evidenced 
by the receipt of an SEC issued Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). 
Using the set of coefficients generated from estimating Dechow et al.‟s (2008) 
manipulation prediction model, I generate a firm-specific estimate of the probability of 
manipulation which is then used as an earnings quality proxy.      
Auditor Size and Audit Quality 
Although audit quality is an unobservable aspect of the financial reporting 
process, prior theoretical and empirical research suggests that audit quality is increasing 
in audit firm size. Theoretical research suggesting an association between audit quality 
and audit firm size is provided by DeAngelo (1981), Simunic and Stein (1996), and 
Dopuch and Simunic (1980, 1982), among others. DeAngelo (1981) suggests that audit 
quality increases in audit firm size because client-specific economic rents (generated 
through client-specific startup costs) serve as collateral against opportunistic behavior on 
the part of the auditor. Because the total value of these economic rents is increasing in 
the number and size of audit clients, large audit firms have more to lose in the event of 
 
10 
an audit failure. As a result, large audit firms have less incentive to allow opportunistic 
reporting decisions (DeAngelo 1981).  
Simunic and Stein (1996) suggest that audit quality is increasing in audit firm 
size because large audit firms are perceived to have „deep pockets‟. This perception 
could encourage investor lawsuits which should entice large audit firms to perform high 
quality audits. Finally, Dopuch and Simunic (1980, 1982) suggest that audit quality is 
increasing in auditor size because larger auditors employ observable characteristics 
associated with audit quality (e.g., specialized training, peer reviews, etc.).    
A large body of empirical evidence supports these theoretical arguments. For 
example, Palmrose (1988) documents that non-Big N auditors are sued more often than 
are Big N auditors, suggesting a higher incidence of audit failure for non-Big N audit 
firms. Feroz et al. (1991) document that non-Big N firms have a higher incidence of SEC 
sanctions and penalties stemming from SEC issued Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Menon and Williams (1991) find that clients and 
investment bankers have a preference for Big N auditors for an initial public offering 
(IPO). Beatty (1989) finds that IPO returns are higher for non-Big N clients, suggesting 
less of an IPO under-pricing problem for Big N clients. Blokdijk et al. (2006) find that 
Big N audit firms are more effective in allocating audit hours, resulting in audits that are 
deemed to be of higher quality. Krishnan and Schauer (2000) find that non-Big N firms 
are less likely to comply with generally accepted accounting principles. Teoh and Wong 
(1993), show that the earnings response coefficient (ERC) is higher for clients of Big N 
audit firms, suggesting that financial statement credibility is higher for clients of Big N 
 
11 
audit firms. Mansi et al. (2004) and Pittman and Fortin (2004) find that the cost of debt 
financing is lower for Big N clients suggesting that Big N audited financial reports are 
more credible. Similarly, Khurana and Raman (2004) show that Big N audited financial 
reports are perceived as being more credible because clients of Big N audit firms have a 
lower ex ante cost of equity capital. Finally, Behn et al. (2007) show that analysts‟ 
forecast accuracy is higher and forecast dispersion is lower, for firms audited by a Big N 
audit firm.  
A number of studies have also examined the association between audit firm size 
and opportunistic financial reporting behavior (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999). 
The tests performed in these studies generally estimate the magnitude and/or direction of 
opportunistic behavior using models which estimate the discretionary component of total 
accruals (i.e., Jones 1991). For example, Becker et al. (1998) and Francis et al. (1999) 
show that clients of non-Big N audit firms report discretionary accruals that are 
significantly higher than discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big N audit firms. 
These results are consistent with Big N audit firms placing greater constraint on 
aggressive financial reporting behavior than non-Big N audit firms. Their results are 
confirmed in later studies which examine the association between earnings management 
and other characteristics of the audit (e.g. auditor tenure) which also include an indicator 
variable for audit firm size (Big N versus non-Big N). For example, in their study 
examining the association between earnings management and auditor tenure, Myers et 
al. (2003) show that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is lower for clients of Big N 
audit firms.  
 
12 
Second-Tier Audit Firms  
As discussed above, prior research suggests that Big N audit firms outperform 
non-Big N audit firms in a variety of empirical contexts. However, most research 
examining the association between various proxies for real and/or perceived audit 
quality and audit firm type uses a dichotomous classification scheme for the variable of 
interest (i.e., Big N versus non-Big N) so that Second-Tier audit firms are classified 
together with other non-Big N audit firms. Recent events in the market for audit services 
suggest that this approach may no longer be warranted. Specifically, a distinct group of 
national audit firms (e.g., BDO Seldman, Grant Thornton) has emerged, and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that these Second-Tier audit firms have been successful in competing 
for former Big N audit firm clients since Andersen‟s collapse and since the 
implementation of SOX (Byrnes 2005; Gullapalli 2005). The post-Andersen/SOX 
growth of Second-Tier audit firms has been persistent with revenue growth exceeding 
that for Big N audit firms in each year since 2003. Moreover, the difference between 
Second-Tier and Big N revenue growth has increased in every year since 2004 (Public 
Accounting Report 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006).  
Several recent studies provide mixed evidence on the quality of Second-Tier 
audits, relative to other audit firm types. Geiger and Rama (2006) examine the 
association between audit firm type and going-concern reporting accuracy. Their results 
suggest no difference in Second-Tier versus other non-Big N going-concern reporting 
accuracy. Francis et al. (1999) examine discretionary accrual estimates (both signed and 
absolute value) and perform univariate tests which indicate a three-tiered audit quality 
 
13 
hierarchy. Specifically, using data from 1988-1994, their results indicate that the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals are smallest for Big N clients, followed by clients of 
national audit firms (i.e., Second-Tier audit firms), followed by clients of all other audit 
firms.
8
   
Farag and Alam (2008) examine pre- to post-SOX changes in Second-Tier audit 
quality and differences between Second-Tier and Big N audit quality in each period. 
Using the accruals quality measure proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) as the proxy 
for audit quality, their results indicate that Big N auditors provide higher quality audits 
in both periods and no pre- to post-SOX change in Second-Tier audit quality. Boone et 
al. (2008) test for post-SOX differences in Big N, Second-Tier, and other non-Big N 
audit quality using a variety of proxies for real and/or perceived audit quality. With 
respect to real audit quality, their results suggest that Big N and Second-Tier clients have 
lower discretionary accruals, relative to other non-Big N clients, and that there is no 
difference in the magnitude Big N and Second-Tier client discretionary accruals. Results 
of tests using proxies for perceived audit quality (e.g., ex ante cost of capital estimates) 
yield mixed results. Finally, Cassell et al. (2007) examine the perceived financial 
reporting credibility of Second-Tier audit firm clients in the periods before and after 
Andersen‟s collapse in 2001. Using a firm-specific estimate of the ex ante cost of equity 
capital as their proxy for perceived financial reporting credibility, the study finds that 
                                                 
8
 Francis et al.‟s (1999) examination of Second-Tier (national) audit firms is limited to univariate tests of 
differences in discretionary accruals estimates by audit firm type over the years 1988-1994.  As such, their 
results provide important initial evidence on the characteristics of Second-Tier audits.  My study extends 
their analysis to examine discretionary accruals estimates in a multivariate framework where other 
determinants of the magnitude and/or direction of discretionary accruals estimates are controlled for.  
Moreover, my tests employ alternative earnings quality proxies and focus on a recent event in the market 
for audit services, namely, the rapid post-Andersen growth of Second-Tier audit practices.   
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perceived financial reporting credibility of Second-Tier audit firm clients is comparable 
to that of other non-Big N audit firm clients, and significantly lower than that of Big N 
audit firm clients, in the pre-Andersen period. However, post-Andersen, the results 
indicate that the financial reporting credibility of Second-Tier audit firm clients is 
comparable to that of Big N audit firm clients and significantly higher than that of other 
non-Big N audit firm clients. In supplemental analyses, the authors find similar results 
when tests are performed using the earnings response coefficient (ERC) as the proxy for 
perceived financial reporting credibility.  
I extend this line of research in a number of ways. First, I contrast Second-Tier 
audit quality with both Big N and other non-Big N audit firms in the pre- and post-
Anderson periods. As a result, I am able to assess the effect of the rapid post-Anderson 
Second-Tier audit firm growth on the audit quality hierarchy from prior research. 
Second, prior audit quality research generally relies on theoretical arguments suggesting 
a positive association between auditor size and audit quality. In contrast, my design 
allows for explicit tests of the theory that audit quality is associated with audit firm size. 
Because of the substantial growth in Second-Tier audit practices, this represents a unique 
opportunity to test this association in a dynamic setting. Finally, I perform extensive 
tests to examine one aspect of audit quality, the resulting quality of reported earnings, 
using three alternative measures of earnings quality.  
I include the following four firms in my Second-Tier audit firm category:  Grant 
Thornton LLP (GT), BDO Seidman LLP (BDO), The Crowe LLP (CROWE), and 
McGladrey and Pullen LLP (MP). This classification scheme is supported by the most 
 
15 
recent report issued by the Public Accounting Report which ranks audit firms based on 
the number of public clients audited, total revenue, and other measures of audit firm 
size.
9
 According to the Public Accounting Report‟s 2006 ranking of the top 100 audit 
firms, GT, BDO, CROWE, and MP rank 5
th
 through 8
th
 respectively, based on the 
number of public clients. In terms of total revenue, MP, GT, BDO, and CROWE rank 5
th
 
through 8
th
 respectively in the 2006 report (Public Accounting Report 2006).
10
 
Despite the rapid growth of Second-Tier audit firms in the post-Andersen era, 
Big N audit firms continue to enjoy a significant size advantage over Second-Tier audit 
firms. For example, the largest Second-Tier audit firms in terms of total revenue (MP 
with total revenue of $1.3 billion) and number of public clients (GT with 411 public 
clients) remain much smaller than the smallest Big 4 audit firm (KPMG with total 
revenue of $4.4 billion and 1,254 public clients) (Public Accounting Report 2006).  
However, I posit that the gap between Big N and Second-Tier (Second-Tier and 
other non-Big N) audited earnings quality may have decreased (increased) post-
Andersen because the post-Andersen growth in Second-Tier audit firm client portfolios 
may have altered the economic incentives faced by these firms (e.g., at-risk economic 
rents that are larger in magnitude, increased litigation exposure, etc.), improved their 
                                                 
9
 The primary Second-Tier classification scheme examined in this study is based on the 2006 Public 
Accounting Report.  However, a historical review of the Public Accounting Report‟s rankings reveals that 
the composition of the Second-Tier has changed over time.  Specifically, when audit firms are ranked 
according to various aspects of audit firm size (e.g., total revenue, number of clients, etc.) in each year 
since 1988, the four firms that I include in my primary definition of the Second-Tier would not be ranked 
5
th
 through 8
th
 throughout the entire sample period (1988-2006).  To alleviate potential concerns relating to 
the changing composition of the Second-Tier, I perform tests to examine the sensitivity of my results to 
the  exclusion of years preceding the establishment of a clear-cut Second-Tier. 
10
 This classification scheme is also supported by a recent article in CFO.com entitled “Back to the Big 
Eight?” which identifies GT, BDO, CROWE, and MP as the “second-tier” firms and indicates that these 
firms are working together with the Big 4 to provide input to regulators and to form the Center for Audit 
Quality (O‟ Sullivan 2007).   
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ability to attract and train specialized personnel, or altered the characteristics of their 
client base. My hypothesis is motivated by prior theoretical (DeAngelo 1981; Dopuch 
and Simunic 1980, 1982; Simunic and Stein 1996) and empirical (Palmrose 1988; Feroz 
et al. 1991; Menon and Williams 1991; Beatty 1989; Krishnan and Schauer 2000; 
Blokdijk et al. 2006; Teoh and Wong 1993; Mansi et al. 2004; Pittman and Fortin 2004; 
Khurana and Raman 2004; Behn et al. 2007; Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999) 
research which suggests that audit quality is increasing in audit firm size and by 
evidence pointing to the rapid growth of Second-Tier audit practices in the post-
Andersen period (Public Accounting Report 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006).  
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CHAPTER III 
 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
As discussed above, I perform tests using three proxies which have been used in 
the prior literature to investigate the magnitude and/or direction of opportunistic 
managerial manipulation. I discuss the estimation of each of these proxies and the 
associated empirical models in detail in the remainder of this chapter. 
Discretionary Accruals 
 
My primary empirical tests employ a firm-specific estimate of the discretionary 
component of total accruals. Specifically, I estimate the discretionary component of total 
accruals using a performance-adjusted modified Jones model because Kothari et al. 
(2005) show that inferences are more reliable when this measure is used. Following 
Kothari et al. (2005), I estimate the following model by year and industry (based on 2-
digit SIC codes) and I eliminate industry-years with less than 10 firm-year observations:  
TAt/ASSETSt-1 =  α + β1 1/ASSETSt-1 + β2 (ΔSALESt-ΔARt)/ASSETSt-1  (1) 
+ β3 PPEt/ASSETSt-1 + β4 ROA + et 
 
where: 
 
TA =  Total accruals (COMPUSTAT # 18 – COMPUSTAT # 308) 
 
ASSETS =  Total assets (COMPUSTAT # 6) 
 
SALES =  Total sales (COMPUSTAT # 12) 
 
AR =   Accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT # 2) 
 
PPE =   Property, plant, and equipment (COMPUSTAT # 7) 
 
ROA =  Return on assets (COMPUSTAT # 18 / COMPUSTAT # 6 prior year) 
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and 
 
et  =   discretionary accruals 
 
Following prior studies, I examine the association between earnings quality and 
audit firm type using both signed (SIGN_DA) and absolute value (ABS_DA) 
discretionary accruals (Becker et al. 1998; Frankel et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003). 
According to Klein (2002), ABS_DA captures managers‟ intervention in reporting 
accounting earnings and should capture the magnitude of opportunistic reporting 
decisions regardless of the direction of the opportunistic behavior. However, it is 
possible that auditors have an asymmetric view of income increasing versus income 
decreasing opportunistic reporting decisions. Therefore, I examine the association 
between earnings quality (using SIGN_DA as the proxy for earnings quality) and audit 
firm type. As discussed below, I examine the association between SIGN_DA and audit 
firm type separately for firms with estimated positive discretionary accruals and firms 
with estimated negative discretionary accruals. 
 My empirical model estimates the association between earnings quality (using 
either ABS_DA or SIGN_DA as the proxy for earnings quality) and audit firm type in 
the pre- and post-Andersen periods, and pre- to post-Andersen changes in the association 
between earnings quality and audit firm type, while controlling for additional factors that 
are associated with discretionary accrual estimates. Specifically, the model is as follows: 
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DA =  α + β1 POST + β2 BIGN + β3 POST*BIGN + β4 SEC_TIER   (2) 
 + Β5 POST*SEC_TIER + β6 lnASSETS + β7 CFO + β8 ABS_TA  
 + β9 LEV + β10 AGE + β11 TENURE + β12 σ
REV+ β13 σ
CFO
 + ε 
 
where:  
DA =  Absolute value (ABS_DA) or signed (SIGN_DA) firm-specific estimate 
of the discretionary accrual component of total accruals estimated using a 
performance-adjusted modified Jones model.  
 
BIGN =  a dummy variable coded 1 if the client engages a Big N audit firm, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
SEC_TIER =  a dummy variable coded 1 if the client engages a Second-Tier audit firm, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
POST =  a dummy variable coded 1 if the observation is from 2001-2006, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
lnASSETS =  the natural log of total assets (COMPUSTAT data item # 6) measured as 
of fiscal year-end. 
 
CFO =  cash flow from operations (COMPUSTAT data item # 308) scaled by 
lagged total assets. 
 
ABS_TA =  the absolute value of total accruals (COMPUSTAT data item # 18 – 
COMPUSTAT data item # 308) scaled by lagged total assets. 
 
LEV =  ratio of total debt to total assets (COMPUSTAT data item # 9 / 
COMPUSTAT data item # 6). 
 
AGE =  the total number of years for which total assets was reported in 
COMPUSTAT. 
 
TENURE =  the number of consecutive years that the firm has retained their current 
auditor. 
 
σREV= The standard deviation of sales (COMPUSTAT # 12) deflated by total 
assets over the current and prior four years. 
 
and  
 
σCFO =  The standard deviation of cash flow from operations (COMPUSTAT # 
308) deflated by total assets over the current and prior four years. 
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The natural log of total assets (lnASSETS) is included as a proxy for firm size 
because accrual activity is expected to vary with firm size (Dechow and Dichev 2002). 
Cash flow from operations (CFO) is included as a control variable because there is a 
negative correlation between cash flow and accruals (Dechow 1994; Sloan 1996). The 
absolute value of total accruals (ABS_TA) is included to control for the firm‟s accruals-
generating potential (Becker et al. 1998). Leverage (LEV) is included because DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1994) find an association between debt covenant violations and 
discretionary accrual choice. Firm age (AGE) is included because prior research 
suggests that accrual characteristics change with changes in the firm life cycle (Anthony 
and Ramesh 1992). Auditor tenure (TENURE) is included because Myers et al. (2003) 
find that firms with longer auditor tenure report discretionary accruals that are smaller in 
magnitude. The standard deviation of revenue (σREV) and the standard deviation of cash 
flow from operations (σCFO) is included because Hribar and Nichols (2007) show that 
operating volatility is highly correlated with absolute value discretionary accruals 
estimates and that statistical inferences may be biased if the partitioning variable of 
interest (here, auditor type) is also correlated with operating volatility.
11
 Finally, I also 
include industry indicator controls (based on 2 digit SIC codes) to control for differences 
in discretionary accrual estimates across industries.  
                                                 
11
 Descriptive statistics suggest that auditor type is, in fact, correlated with operating volatility.  
Specifically, Big N clients generally exhibit the lowest operating volatility, followed by Second-Tier 
clients and other non-Big N clients.   
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Accruals Quality 
 
Although discretionary accruals estimates generated using variations of the Jones 
(1991) model have been used extensively in prior earnings management research, this 
approach has also been subject to extensive criticism (Guay et al. 1996; Bernard and 
Skinner 1996). Recently, many researchers have adopted an approach suggested by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) who model the association between current period accruals 
and past, current, and future cash flows. Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that, because 
their model provides a measure of the extent to which current accruals map into 
operating cash flows, the model provides a more direct measure of accruals quality.  
I use a modified version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as suggested 
by McNichols (2002) and implemented by Srinidhi and Gul (2007) to generate a firm-
specific accruals quality estimate. Following McNichols (2002), I estimate the following 
model by year and industry (based on Fama and French 1997 industry classifications) 
and I eliminate industry-years with fewer than 20 firm-year observations:  
TCAt = α + β1OCFt-1 + β2OCFt + β3OCFt+1 + β4ΔREVt + β5PPEt + et    (3) 
 
where: 
 
TCA =  Total current accruals (ΔCOMPUSTAT # 4 – ΔCOMPUSTAT # 1  
- (ΔCOMPUSTAT # 5 – ΔCOMPUSTAT # 34)), scaled by average total 
assets (COMPUSTAT # 6). 
 
OCF =  Operating cash flow (COMPUSTAT # 308), scaled by average total 
assets (COMPUSTAT # 6). 
 
ΔREV =  Change in revenues (COMPUSTAT #12), scaled by average total assets 
(COMPUSTAT # 6). 
 
PPE =  Property, plant, and equipment (COMPUSTAT # 7), scaled by average 
total assets (COMPUSTAT # 6). 
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and  
 
et  =  Residual 
 
Following Srinidhi and Gul (2007), my proxy for accruals quality (ABS_DD) is 
equal to the absolute value of the residual obtained from Model 3.
12
 My empirical tests 
are based on the following multivariate model which estimates the association between 
accruals quality (ABS_DD) and audit firm type in the pre- and post-Andersen periods, 
and pre- to post-Andersen changes in the association between accruals quality and audit 
firm type, while controlling for additional factors that are associated with accruals 
quality estimates. Specifically, the model is as follows: 
ABS_DD =  α + β1 POST + β2 BIGN + β3 POST*BIGN + β4 SEC_TIER   (4) 
       + Β5 POST*SEC_TIER + β6 lnASSETS + β7 lnOPCYCLE        
       + β8 σ
REV + β9 σ
CFO
 + β10 LOSS + ε 
where:  
ABS_DD =  Absolute value firm-specific estimate of accruals quality 
estimated using a modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model.  
 
lnOPCYCLE =  The natural log of OPCYCLE; OPCYCLE = (360 / (sales / 
average accounts receivable)) + (360 / (cost of goods sold / 
average inventory)); for firms in the business services industry,  
OPCYCLE = (360 / (sales / average accounts receivable)); sales = 
COMPUSTAT # 12; accounts receivable = COMPUSTAT # 2; 
cost of goods sold = COMPUSTAT # 41; inventory = 
COMPUSTAT # 3. 
 
LOSS =  A dummy variable coded 1 if net income (COMPUSTAT # 172) 
is less than zero, 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
12
 This approach is suggested by Dechow and Dichev (2002) as an alternative version of their primary 
accruals quality measure which is based on the standard deviation of firm-specific residuals over a rolling 
five year window.  In the context of my study, a firm-year accruals quality measure is preferred because, 
absent the deletion of all firms who experienced a change in auditor type, a given firm-specific accruals 
quality estimate could be generated for a firm with more than one auditor type during the five year 
estimation window.  I discuss sensitivity tests which use the primary Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals 
quality measure in Chapter IV.        
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and 
 
all other variables are as defined previously. 
 
Model 4 includes several control variables as suggested by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002). The natural log of total assets (lnASSETS) is included as a proxy for firm size 
because large firms are generally more stable which is expected to translate into smaller 
accrual estimation errors (Dechow and Dichev 2002). Also, accrual estimation errors are 
expected to be positively associated with the length of the operating cycle 
(lnOPCYCLE) and operating volatility (σREV, σCFO, LOSS) (Dechow and Dichev 2002). 
Finally, I also include industry indicator controls (based on 2 digit SIC codes) to control 
for differences in accruals quality estimates across industries.  
Likelihood of Manipulation 
 
 The two empirical proxies that I have described thus far attempt to decompose 
total or current accruals and identify the portion that appears to be driven by managerial 
discretion. These models use firm and industry characteristics to estimate the accruals 
decomposition and generate firm-specific estimates of the magnitude and/or direction of 
the discretionary behavior. An alternative to this approach is proposed by Dechow et al. 
(2008) who model the likelihood of material accounting manipulation. Specifically, 
Dechow et al. (2008) identify a large sample of firms who have allegedly manipulated 
their financial statements as evidenced by an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release (AAER) issued by the SEC. The authors develop a prediction model to assess 
the likelihood of manipulation using a set of AAER firms and a corresponding set of 
public firms that did not receive an AAER. Using the coefficients from their prediction 
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model, a set of firm-specific probability estimates can be found.  The estimated 
probability represents the likelihood that the firm, based on firm characteristics, would 
report manipulated financial statements. The firm-specific probability is then scaled to 
derive a firm-specific score which Dechow et al. (2008) term the F-Score.  
 Dechow et al. (2008) estimate their prediction model using three variations on 
the set of independent variables. The first variation includes only financial statement 
variables (e.g., change in receivables, change in cash sales, etc.). The second adds off-
balance sheet and non-financial variables (e.g., abnormal change in employees). Finally, 
the third variation adds stock market based variables (e.g., lagged market-adjusted stock 
return). The authors evaluate the set of model estimates in terms of correct classification 
rates, sensitivity, and type I and II errors. In each case, the results indicate that the 
additional variables included in the second and third model variations do not improve the 
model diagnostics. Specifically, the model estimate that includes only financial 
statement variables has the highest classification rate and the lowest incidence of Type I 
and II errors. Accordingly, my tests of the likelihood of manipulation utilize the 
coefficient estimates generated by this variation of the Dechow et al. 2008 model (see 
Dechow et al. 2008, Table 7 Panel A). Specifically, the model is written as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
LogitF-Score =  -6.789 + 0.817(RSST) + 3.230(ΔAR) + 2.436(ΔINV) (5)  
 + 0.122(ΔCASH_SALE) – 0.992(ΔEARNINGS) + 0.972(ISSUE)   
 
where: 
 
RSST =   Richardson et al. (2006) accruals measure (ΔWC + ΔNCO + 
ΔFIN)/average total assets; WC = (COMPUSTAT # 4 – 
COMPUSTAT #1) – (COMPUSTAT # 5 – COMPUSTAT # 34); 
NCO = (COMPUSTAT # 6 – COMPUSTAT # 4 – COMPUSTAT 
# 32) – (COMPUSTAT # 181 – COMPUSTAT # 5 – 
COMPUSTAT # 9); FIN = (COMPUSTAT # 193 + 
COMPUSTAT # 32) – (COMPUSTAT # 9 + COMPUSTAT # 34 
+ COMPUSTAT # 130). 
 
ΔAR =  Change in accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT # 2), scaled by 
average total assets. 
 
ΔINV =  Change in inventory (COMPUSTAT # 3), scaled by average total 
assets. 
 
ΔCASH_SALE =  Percentage change in CASH_SALE; CASH_SALE = 
COMPUSTAT # 12 - ΔAR (unscaled). 
 
ΔEARNINGS =  Change in EARNINGS; EARNINGS = COMPUSTAT # 18, 
scaled by average total assets. 
 
ISSUE = An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm issued securities during 
the year; ISSUE = 1 if COMPUSTAT # 108 > 0 or COMPUSTAT 
# 111 > 0. 
 
and 
 
F-Score =  A scaled probability of manipulation; [exp(LogitF-Score)]/[1 + 
exp(LogitF-Score)], scaled by the unconditional probability of 
manipulation which Dechow et al. (2008) calculate as 0.00345. 
 
I perform univariate tests and audit firm client portfolio analyses using the firm-
specific F-Score estimates derived using the model described above. Specifically, my 
tests include univariate tests of differences in means by period (pre- and post-Andersen) 
and auditor type. In addition, I construct annual F-Score deciles and compute the 
 
26 
percentage of Big N, Second-Tier, and other non-Big N clients which fall into the two 
highest deciles (firms that are most likely to have a financial statement manipulation) in 
each period. These analyses are then used to evaluate whether it appears that Second-
Tier clients have a reduced probability of manipulation post-Andersen, relative to the 
pre-Andersen period, and to compare changes in the Second-Tier client portfolio to the 
changes observed in the client portfolios of the other auditor types.  
Controls for Potential Selection Bias  
 
Although audit firm selection (by the client) and client selection (by the auditor) 
are likely driven by auditor characteristics and client risk characteristics (e.g., auditor 
size, client size, leverage, and operating performance) which are included as control 
variables in Models 2 and 4, it is possible that additional factors influence the joint 
selection decision. These omitted factors could induce a selection bias which may 
influence the results. I employ two alternative methods to address potential concerns 
relating to such a selection bias.  
First, I employ a two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure where the first-stage 
model predicts the selection of a Big N auditor.
13
 The selection model includes each of 
the control variables in the respective outcome model (Models 2 and 4).
14
 I then compute 
and include the inverse Mills ratio (INVMILLS) as a control for omitted factors 
                                                 
13
 The selection equation models the selection of a Big N versus non-Big N auditor.  Accordingly, 
subsequent estimations of Models 2 and 4 which include a control for self-selection bias include a single 
inverse Mills ratio (INVMILLS).  When a three-tiered dependent variable is used in the selection model 
(e.g., Big N, Second-Tier, and other non-Big N) and multiple inverse Mills ratios are included in the 
estimation of Models 2 and 4, severe multicollinearity issues arise.  Nevertheless, untabulated results 
indicate that these issues do not alter the tenor of the reported results.     
14
 The Heckman (1979) procedure is generally implemented by including additional variables which are 
not included in the outcome model as predictors of the selection decision.  However, Maddala (1983) and 
Wooldridge (2002) argue that additional variables are not technically necessary and that the inclusion of 
inappropriate variables could be problematic.   
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correlated with the decision to select a Big N auditor. Second, I perform tests on a 
restricted sample which excludes all observations for any company that switched audit 
firm type (e.g., from Big N to Second-Tier, from Second-Tier to other non-Big N, etc.) 
during the sample period. In the following chapter, I report results of four alternative 
specifications of Models 2 and 4: no control for selection bias, control for selection bias 
using the Heckman (1979) approach or the restricted sample approach, and control for 
selection bias using both the Heckman (1979) approach and the restricted sample 
approach. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this chapter, I describe data collection, descriptive statistics, and multivariate 
results for tests performed using each of the three earnings quality proxies described in 
the preceding chapter. To date, most evidence pointing to the post-Andersen growth in 
Second-Tier audit practices is based on individual statistics and/or anecdotal evidence 
which do not provide a complete picture of the relative speed or magnitude of their 
growth. I begin this chapter with an empirical analysis of Second-Tier audit firm growth 
to provide a more comprehensive view of changes in Second-Tier audit firm practices.   
Evidence on the Growth of Second-Tier Audit Firms 
 To provide a comprehensive measure of the growth of Second-Tier audit 
practices, relative to Big N audit firms, I performed a principle components analysis 
(PCA) which included data capturing various aspects of Second-Tier and Big N audit 
firm growth during the period 1998-2007. PCA is based on a mathematical algorithm 
which attempts to reduce the dimensionality of a dataset by transforming (potentially) 
correlated variables into a set of uncorrelated principal components. To perform the 
analysis, I collected data on the percentage growth in total audit firm revenue, 
percentage growth in total number of professionals, percentage growth in the number of 
audit firm offices, and percentage growth in the number of SEC clients for each Big N 
and Second-Tier firm during the period 1998-2007 from the Public Accounting Report 
(2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). Thus, the PCA attempts to reduce the dimensionality 
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across four aspects of audit firm growth and identify certain commonalities in the data. 
The resulting principle components can be viewed as independent (e.g., uncorrelated) 
aspects of audit firm growth and the resulting factor scores can be viewed as measures of 
the magnitude of audit firm growth for that aspect.  
Results from the principle components analysis indicate two components with 
eigenvalues greater than one. The first component, which is primarily associated with 
the percentage change in revenue and the percentage change in the number of 
professionals, explains approximately 40 percent of the variation in the four measures. 
The second component is primarily associated with the percentage change in the number 
of offices and the percentage change in the number of SEC clients and explains 
approximately 26% of the remaining variation in the four measures. Figures 1 and 2 
provide a graphical display of the factor scores for each of the two components and for 
each of the four measures used in the principle components analysis by year and auditor 
type.
15
 The results for the factor scores for component 1 (Figure 1 Panel A) are strongest 
with Second-Tier growth exceeding Big N growth in each year except 2001. The 
remaining graphs (Figure 1 Panel B and Figure 2) indicate a consistent pattern in which 
Second-Tier growth exceeds that of Big N firms in a majority of the years since 2001. In 
sum, the analyses in Figures 1 and 2 provide empirical evidence suggesting that the post-
Andersen growth of Second-Tier audit firms was rapid, exceeded that of Big N audit 
firms, and was multi-dimensional. As such, these results provide support for my 
                                                 
15
 The factor score inputs (e.g., change in total revenue, change in number of professionals, etc.) and 
summary factor scores (e.g. Component 1 and 2) are generated for each individual audit firm in each year.  
The analyses in Figures 1 and 2 are based on annual means calculated by auditor type. 
 
30 
examination of Second-Tier audit quality characteristics and for the motivation behind 
my hypothesis which suggests an improvement in Second-Tier client earnings quality 
resulting from their growth.   
Discretionary Accruals 
Data 
All data used in this section are collected from COMPUSTAT. The sample 
period begins in 1988 because this is the first year in which specific non-Big N audit 
firms are identified by COMPUSTAT. I perform tests on two samples (i.e., the full 
sample and the restricted sample) using observations from 1988 through 2006. The pre-
Andersen period is fiscal years 1988 through 2000 and the post-Andersen period is fiscal 
years 2001-2006. For both samples, I delete firms incorporated in a foreign country, 
firms in regulated and financial industries (i.e., with SIC codes 4000 through 4999 and 
6000 through 6999), firms with total assets less than $1 million (COMPUSTAT data 
item # 6), firms with missing COMPUSTAT data needed to estimate the discretionary 
accruals model (Model 1), firms with missing auditor information (COMPUSTAT data 
item #149), and firms with missing COMPUSTAT data items needed to construct the 
variables included in Model 2. For each year, I determine which observations are in the 
top or bottom 1 percent of the distribution of cash flow from operations (CFO) and 
signed discretionary accruals (SIGN_DA) and delete these observations to limit the 
influence of outliers on my results (Myers et al. 2003). These procedures yield a sample 
which consists of 87,157 company-year observations (69,890 Big N audited 
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observations, 5,347 Second-Tier audited observations, and 11,920 other non-Big N 
audited observations).  
As discussed above, I also perform tests on a restricted sample to address the 
potential selection biases associated with audit firm and/or client selection. The 
restricted sample excludes all observations for any company that switched audit firm 
type (e.g., from Big N to Second-Tier, from Second-Tier to other non-Big N, etc.) during 
the sample period. This procedure eliminates 26,085 company-year observations and 
yields a restricted sample comprised of 61,072 company-year observations (54,245 Big 
N audited observations, 1,218 Second-Tier audited observations, and 5,609 other non-
Big N audited observations). Table 2 summarizes the derivation of the full and restricted 
samples.  
Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (ABS_DA and SIGN_DA) are 
presented in Table 3 (for the full sample) and Table 4 (for the restricted sample). In 
Table 3 Panel A, I present descriptive statistics for the full sample by audit firm type, 
pooled over the entire sample period (1988-2006). With respect to absolute value 
discretionary accrual estimates (ABS_DA),  the statistics in Panel A indicate that Big N 
audit firm clients report discretionary accruals that are smaller in magnitude than those 
reported by Second-Tier audit firm clients (p = 0.000) and clients of other non-Big N 
audit firms (p = 0.000). Second-Tier clients report discretionary accruals that are smaller 
in magnitude than those reported by clients of other non-Big N audit firms (p = 0.000). 
In Table 3 Panel C, I present descriptive statistics for the full sample by audit firm type 
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and time period.   In Panel C, the descriptive statistics indicate that these relationships 
hold in both periods (pre- and post-Andersen). Statistics in Panel C also indicate that the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) increased pre- to post-Andersen for Big 
N clients (p = 0.000) and for other non-Big N clients (p = 0.000) but not for Second-Tier 
clients.    
With respect to signed discretionary accrual estimates (SIGN_DA), descriptive 
statistics in Panel A indicate no significant difference in the signed discretionary 
accruals reported by Big N and Second-Tier clients (p = 0.738). Other non-Big N audit 
firm clients report signed discretionary accruals that are significantly more negative 
(income decreasing) than Big N clients (p = 0.000) and Second-Tier clients (p =0.009). 
In Panel C, the descriptive results indicate that these relationships hold only in the pre-
Andersen period. Post-Andersen, the results indicate no significant difference in the 
signed discretionary accruals reported by Big N, Second-Tier, or other non-Big N audit 
firm clients. Results in Panel C also indicate that signed discretionary accruals are more 
negative pre- to post-Andersen for Big N clients (p = 0.000) and Second-Tier  clients (p 
= 0.038).  
Descriptive statistics for the restricted sample are presented in Table 4 and are 
consistent with those reported for the full sample in Table 3 with one exception. 
Specifically, the results in Table 4 Panel C indicate that the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) increased pre- to post-Andersen for Second-Tier 
clients (p = 0.003), a result which was insignificant in Table 3 Panel C. Overall, the 
descriptive results for ABS_DA and SIGN_DA indicate that pre-to post-Andersen 
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increases in the magnitude of discretionary accruals appear to be associated with signed 
discretionary accruals which are more negative (income decreasing) in the post-
Andersen period. As such, the results suggest a pre- to post-Andersen increase in 
reporting conservatism, particularly for Big N and Second-Tier audit firm clients.     
Descriptive statistics for the control variables in Model 2 are presented in Table 5 
(for the full sample) and Table 6 (for the restricted sample). In both tables, descriptive 
results for Big N, Second-Tier, and other non-Big N audit firm clients, are presented in 
Panels A, B, and C respectively. In Panel D, I compare the control variable means across 
audit firm types in each period (pre- and post-Andersen). The results in these two tables 
are similar so I focus my discussion on the results from the full sample (Table 5) and 
highlight any differences in the results from the restricted sample (Table 6). With respect 
to firm size (lnASSETS), Big N clients are significantly larger than Second-Tier clients 
and Second-Tier clients are significantly larger than other non-Big N clients. These 
results hold in the pre- and post-Andersen period and the results indicate a significant 
pre- to post-Andersen increase in client size for each audit firm type. Cash flow from 
operations (CFO) is significantly higher for Big N clients than for Second-Tier clients 
and CFO is significantly higher for Second-Tier clients than for other non-Big N clients 
in both periods (pre- and post-Andersen). CFO increased for Big N and Second-Tier 
clients (the latter result is insignificant in Table 6) while CFO decreased other non-Big N 
clients. In both periods (pre- and post-Andersen), Big N clients reported total accruals 
which were smaller in magnitude (ABS_TA) than Second-Tier clients who reported 
ABS_TA which was smaller than other non-Big N clients. With respect to leverage 
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(LEV), the results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that Big N and Second-Tier clients 
generally have higher LEV than other non-Big N clients. Also, Big N clients are 
generally older (AGE) and have longer auditor tenure (TENURE) than Second-Tier and 
other non-Big N clients.  
Multivariate Results 
 As previously discussed, I estimate Model 2 using two discretionary accrual 
estimates (ABS_DA and SIGN_DA). Because the sample includes multiple observations 
for a given firm (client), all regressions estimate standard errors based on clustering at 
the firm (client) level. All test statistics are based on Roger‟s standard errors (White 
corrected) which adjust for possible correlation of residuals within firm clusters 
(Petersen 2008).    
For the regressions with ABS_DA as the dependent variable, results are 
presented in Table 7 (for the full sample) and Table 8 (for the restricted sample). For the 
regressions with SIGN_DA as the dependent variable, I use a maximum likelihood 
truncated regression approach to estimate Model 2. Specifically, the truncated regression 
approach employed uses a tobit regression with a lower (upper) bound of zero for the 
positive (negative) discretionary accruals dataset.
16
 Results for the positive discretionary 
accrual sample are presented in Table 9 (for the full sample) and Table 10 (for the 
restricted sample). Results for the negative discretionary accrual sample are presented in 
Table 11 (for the full sample) and Table 12 (for the restricted sample). In Tables 7 
                                                 
16
  The truncated regression approach is preferred because ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are 
generally biased towards zero when OLS is used to estimate a model on a truncated sample (Greene 2003).   
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through 12, Panel A (Panel B) presents results of the estimation of Model 2 without 
(with) the inverse Mills ratio (INVMILLS) control for selection bias.  
Absolute Value Discretionary Accruals  
 Results from estimates of Model 2 with ABS_DA as the dependent variable (full 
sample) are presented in Table 7. In Panel A, the negative and significant coefficient on 
BIGN indicates that Big N clients have lower ABS_DA than clients of other non-Big N 
auditors in the pre-Andersen period (p = 0.000). The insignificant coefficient on 
SEC_TIER indicates that ABS_DA is comparable for Second-Tier and other non-Big N 
clients in the pre-Andersen period. A joint test (BIGN = SEC_TIER) confirms that the 
pre-Andersen BIGN coefficient is significantly more negative than the pre-Andersen 
SEC_TIER coefficient (p = 0.000).  
 The interactions between the post-Andersen indicator variable (POST) and 
auditor type (BIGN and SEC_TIER) are both negative and significant (p = 0.000). 
Moreover, the joint tests for the post-Andersen effects (BIG N + POST*BIGN and 
SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) are both negative and significant (p = 0.000). These 
results indicate that ABS_DA is lower for both Big N and Second-Tier clients than for 
other non-Big N clients in the post-Andersen period. Finally, a joint test (BIGN + 
POST*BIGN = SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) contrasting the post-Andersen effect 
of Big N audit firm affiliation with that of Second-Tier audit firm affiliation is 
insignificant (p = 0.398) indicating that there is no difference in the post-Andersen 
BIGN and SEC_TIER coefficient estimates.  
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 Results in Panel B are consistent with those in Panel A. In both Panel A and 
Panel B, the results indicate a negative association between ABS_DA and CFO and 
AGE and a positive association between ABS_DA and ABS_TA and σREV. In Panel B, 
the results also indicate a positive association between ABS_DA and TENURE.  
 The results for the restricted sample, presented in Table 8, are generally 
consistent with those presented in Table 7 with a few exceptions. First, the results in 
Table 8 Panel A and Panel B indicate that the interactions between POST and 
SEC_TIER are not significant (p = 0.184 and 0.220 respectively). The joint test 
(SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) is negative and significant (p = 0.072) in Panel A but 
insignificant in Panel B. Finally, a joint test (BIGN + POST*BIGN = SEC_TIER + 
POST*SEC_TIER) contrasting the post-Andersen effect of Big N audit firm affiliation 
with that of Second-Tier audit firm affiliation is significant (p = 0.094) in Panel A 
indicating that the post-Andersen effect of auditor affiliation on ABS_DA is more 
negative for Big N clients than for Second-Tier clients .  
 Overall, the results in Tables 7 and 8 suggest a pre- to post-Andersen 
improvement in Second-Tier client earnings quality, relative to the client earnings 
quality of the other audit firm types (Big N and other non-Big N). A summary of the pre- 
to post-Anderson changes in the audit firm client earnings quality hierarchy is presented 
in Table 13. 
Positive Discretionary Accruals  
 Results from estimates of Model 2 with SIGN_DA as the dependent variable 
(full sample), positive discretionary accruals sample, are presented in Table 9. In Panel 
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A, the negative and significant coefficient on BIGN indicates that Big N clients have 
lower positive discretionary accruals than other non-Big N clients in the pre-Andersen 
period (p = 0.001). The insignificant coefficient on SEC_TIER indicates that Second-
Tier clients have positive discretionary accruals that are comparable to those for other 
non-Big N clients in the pre-Andersen period. A joint test (BIGN = SEC_TIER) 
confirms that the pre-Andersen BIGN coefficient is significantly more negative than the 
pre-Andersen SEC_TIER coefficient (p = 0.000). The interactions between the post-
Andersen indicator variable (POST) and audit firm type (BIGN and SEC_TIER) are 
both negative and significant (p = 0.002 and 0.003 respectively). Moreover, the joint 
tests for the post-Andersen effects (BIG N + POST*BIGN and SEC_TIER + 
POST*SEC_TIER) are both negative and significant (p = 0.000 and 0.006 respectively). 
These results indicate that positive discretionary accruals are lower for both Big N and 
Second-Tier clients than for other non-Big N clients in the post-Andersen period. 
Finally, a joint test (BIGN + POST*BIGN = SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) 
contrasting the post-Andersen effect of Big N audit firm affiliation with that of Second-
Tier audit firm affiliation is insignificant (p = 0.195) indicating that the post-Andersen 
effect for Big N clients is not significantly different from that for clients of Second-Tier 
audit firms.  
 Results in Panel B are consistent with those in Panel A with one exception. 
Specifically, the joint test (BIGN + POST*BIGN = SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) 
contrasting the post-Andersen effect of Big N audit firm affiliation with that of Second-
Tier audit firm affiliation is significant (p = 0.080) indicating that the post-Andersen 
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effect for Big N clients is significantly more negative than that for clients of Second-Tier 
audit firms. In both Panel A and Panel B, the results indicate a negative association 
between positive discretionary accruals and CFO and a positive association between 
positive discretionary accruals and lnASSETS and ABS_TA and σREV. In Panel B, the 
results also indicate a negative association between positive discretionary accruals and 
TENURE.  
 The results for the restricted sample, presented in Table 10, are consistent with 
those presented in Table 9 with one exception. Specifically, in Panel B, the joint test 
(BIGN + POST*BIGN = SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) contrasting the post-
Andersen effect of Big N audit firm affiliation with that of Second-Tier audit firm 
affiliation is insignificant indicating that the post-Andersen effect for Big N clients is not 
significantly different from that for clients of Second-Tier audit firms. Overall, the 
results in Tables 9 and 10 suggest a pre- to post-Andersen improvement in Second-Tier 
client earnings quality, relative to the client earnings quality of the other audit firm types 
(Big N and other non-Big N). A summary of the pre- to post-Anderson changes in the 
audit firm client earnings quality hierarchy is presented in Table 13. 
Negative Discretionary Accruals 
 Results from estimates of Model 2 with SIGN_DA as the dependent variable 
(full sample), negative discretionary accruals sample, are presented in Table 11. In Panel 
A, the positive and significant coefficients on BIGN (p = 0.000) and SEC_TIER (p = 
0.082) indicate that both Big N and Second-Tier clients have lower negative 
discretionary accruals than other non-Big N clients in the pre-Andersen period. A joint 
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test (BIGN = SEC_TIER) indicates that the pre-Andersen BIGN coefficient is 
significantly more positive than the pre-Andersen SEC_TIER coefficient (p = 0.010). 
The interactions between the post-Andersen indicator variable (POST) and audit firm 
type (BIGN and SEC_TIER) are both positive and significant (p = 0.000 and 0.001 
respectively). Moreover, the joint tests for the post-Andersen effects (BIG N + 
POST*BIGN and SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) are both positive and significant (p 
= 0.000). These results indicate that negative discretionary accruals are lower for both 
Big N and Second-Tier clients than for other non-Big N clients in the post-Andersen 
period. Finally, a joint test (BIGN + POST*BIGN = SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) 
contrasting the post-Andersen effect of Big N audit firm affiliation with that of Second-
Tier audit firm affiliation is insignificant (p = 0.841) indicating that there is no difference 
in the post-Andersen BIGN and SEC_TIER coefficient estimates.  
 Results in Panel B are consistent with those in Panel A with two exceptions. 
Specifically, the coefficients on SEC_TIER and the interaction between the post-
Andersen indicator variable (POST) and BIGN are insignificant. However, the joint test 
(SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) remains positive and significant (p=0.000). As such, 
the exceptions described above do not alter the tenor of the results which suggest an 
improvement in Second-Tier client earnings quality, relative to the other auditor types.  
 In both Panel A and Panel B, the results indicate a negative association between 
negative discretionary accruals and ABS_TA and TENURE and a positive association 
between negative discretionary accruals and AGE. The results for lnASSETS are mixed 
across the two panels.  
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 The results for the restricted sample, presented in Table 12, are generally 
inconsistent with those presented in Table 11. In both Panel A and Panel B, the 
interactions between POST and SEC_TIER are not significant (p = 0.543 and 0.674 
respectively). Moreover, the joint tests (SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) indicate that 
the post-Andersen effect for SEC_TIER is insignificant (p = 0.268 and 0.477 
respectively). Finally, the joint tests contrasting the effects of Big N audit firm affiliation 
with that of Second-Tier audit firm affiliation are insignificant pre-Andersen (BIGN = 
SEC_TIER, p = 0.197 and 0.415 respectively) and significant post-Andersen in Panel A 
(BIGN + POST*BIGN = SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER, p = 0.087). In sum, the 
results in Table 12 are inconsistent with those derived from Tables 7-11 and do not 
indicate a pre- to post-Andersen improvement in Second-Tier client earnings quality, 
relative to the client earnings quality of the other audit firm types (Big N and other non-
Big N).  
  The results in Table 11, but not Table 12, suggest a pre- to post-Andersen 
improvement in Second-Tier client earnings quality, relative to the client earnings 
quality of the other audit firm types (Big N and non-Big N). A summary of the pre- to 
post-Anderson changes in the audit firm client earnings quality hierarchy is presented in 
Table 13. 
Summary 
 A summary of the results from Tables 7 – 12 is presented in Table 13. With the 
exception of the results presented in Table 12, the results portray a consistent pattern 
which suggests a general improvement in Second-Tier client earnings quality, relative to 
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the client earnings quality of the other audit firm types (Big N and other non-Big N). 
Specifically, a comparison of the pre-Andersen coefficient estimates in Tables 7-11 
(Panels A and B) indicates that Second-Tier client earnings quality was not distinct from 
that of other non-Big N clients in nine of ten tests. That is, the pre-Andersen Second-Tier 
coefficient estimate was significant in only one of the ten regressions presented in Tables 
7-11 (Panels A and B). However, a comparison of the post-Andersen coefficient 
estimates indicates that Second-Tier client earnings quality was distinct from that of 
other non-Big N clients in nine of ten tests. That is, the post-Andersen Second-Tier 
coefficient estimate was significant in nine of the ten regressions presented in Tables 7-
11 (Panels A and B).  
 A comparison of the pre-Andersen joint tests contrasting the BIGN and 
SEC_TIER coefficient estimates (BIGN = SEC_TIER) indicates that Big N client 
earnings quality exceeded that of Second-Tier clients in each of the ten tests.  However, 
for the post-Andersen joint tests (BIGN + POST*BIGN = SEC_TIER + 
POST*SEC_TIER), the results indicate that Second-Tier client earnings quality was 
comparable to that of Big N clients in eight of ten tests. In sum, the results provide 
evidence suggesting that Second-Tier audit firms have improved their position within the 
audit firm client earnings quality hierarchy and have distinguished themselves from 
other non-Big N audit firms. Moreover, the post-Andersen results provide partial 
evidence suggesting that there is no difference in the quality of Second-Tier and Big N 
client earnings.    
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Sensitivity Analyses 
I perform a number of sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of the results 
presented in the preceding section. First, I perform tests to assess the robustness of my 
results to alternative Second-Tier audit firm definitions. I construct two additional 
Second-Tier audit firm definitions (specifically, a three firm Second-Tier and a five firm 
Second-Tier) where membership is based on the number of client-year observations 
available in my sample for a given audit firm. The three-firm Second-Tier includes all of 
the audit firms in the primary Second-Tier group with the exception of the Crowe Group 
(which has the fewest observations among the audit firms in the primary Second-Tier 
group). The five-firm Second-Tier includes all of the audit firms in the primary Second-
Tier group along with the Eisner LLP (which has the most observations among the audit 
firms not included in the primary Second-Tier group). The results using these alternative 
Second-Tier audit firm definitions are presented in Tables 14-16 (three firm Second-
Tier) and Tables 17-19 (five firm Second-Tier) and the tenor of the results is consistent 
with those reported in Tables 7-12 with one exception. Specifically, results in Table 17 
Panel B (with control for selection bias) indicate no improvement in Second-Tier client 
earnings quality, relative to the client earnings quality of the other audit firm types (Big 
N and other non-Big N).  
Second, I winzorize, rather than delete, outliers based on the cash flow from 
operations (CFO) and signed discretionary accruals (SIGN_DA) variables. The results of 
tests using this alternative sample are presented in Tables 20-22 and the tenor of the 
results is consistent with those presented in Tables 7-12.    
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The third set of sensitivity analyses was performed to alleviate potential concerns 
relating to the composition of the firms included in the Second-Tier over time. 
Specifically, if audit firms were ranked according to various aspects of audit firm size 
(e.g., total revenue, number of clients, etc.) in each year since 1988, the four firms that I 
include in my primary definition of the Second-Tier would not be ranked 5
th
 through 8
th
 
throughout the entire sample period (1988-2006). A consistent ranking of the three firms 
in the 5
th
 through 7
th
 positions is not established until 1995. Although there has been 
some movement within the 5
th
 through 7
th
 positions since 1995, the composition of firms 
included in these positions has not changed. To address this issue, I examine the 
sensitivity of my results to the exclusion of the years preceding the establishment of a 
clear-cut three-firm Second-Tier.  
 Results from tests using data from 1995 forward (three-firm Second-Tier) are 
presented in Tables 23-25 and the tenor of the results is consistent with those presented 
in Tables 7-12 with two exceptions. First, the results in Table 23 Panel B indicate a 
deterioration in Second-Tier client earnings quality, relative to the client earnings quality 
of the other audit firm types (Big N and other non-Big N). Second, the results in Table 
25 Panel A indicate no change in Second-Tier earnings quality, relative to the client 
earnings quality of the other audit firm types. Nevertheless, the results do indicate that 
Second-Tier client earnings quality was distinct from that of other non-Big N clients and 
comparable to Big N clients in both the pre- and post-Andersen periods.   
Finally, I perform tests to assess the robustness of my results to the exclusion of 
the operating volatility control variables suggested by Hribar and Nichols (2007) in the 
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positive and negative discretionary accruals regressions. As discussed above, Hribar and 
Nichols (2007) suggest including measures of performance volatility (σREV, σCFO) 
because these measures are highly correlated with absolute value discretionary accruals 
estimates. However, Hribar and Nichols (2007) suggest that these measures are not 
correlated with signed discretionary accruals estimates. Accordingly, I re-estimate the 
regressions with SIGN_DA as the dependent variable after excluding the σREV and σCFO 
control variables. The results of these tests, presented in Tables 26-27, are consistent 
with those presented in Tables 9-12.  
Accruals Quality 
Data 
All data used in this section are collected from COMPUSTAT. For reasons 
described above, the sample period begins in 1988 and I perform tests on two samples 
(i.e., the full sample and the restricted sample) comprised of observations from 1988 
through 2006. The pre-Andersen period is comprised of fiscal years 1988 through 2000 
and the post-Andersen period is comprised of fiscal years 2001-2006. For both samples, 
I delete firms incorporated in a foreign country, firms in regulated and financial 
industries (i.e., with SIC codes 4000 through 4999 and 6000 through 6999), firms with 
total assets less than $1 million (COMPUSTAT data item # 6), firms with missing 
COMPUSTAT data needed to estimate the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (Model 
3), firms with missing auditor information (COMPUSTAT data item #149), and firms 
with missing COMPUSTAT data items needed to construct the variables included in 
Model 4. For each year, I determine which observations are in the top or bottom 1 
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percent of the distribution of the signed residual generated by estimating Model 3 and 
delete these observations to limit the influence of outliers on my results. These 
procedures yield the full sample which consists of 64,952 company-year observations 
(53,162 Big N audited observations, 4,097 Second-Tier audited observations, and 7,693 
other non-Big N audited observations).  
As described in the preceding section, I also perform tests on a restricted sample 
to address the potential selection bias associated with audit firm and/or client selection. I 
delete all observations for any company that switched audit firm types (e.g., from Big N 
to Second-Tier, from Second-Tier to other non-Big N, etc.) during the sample period. 
This procedure eliminates 16,573 company-year observations and yields a restricted 
sample comprised of 48,379 company-year observations (43,437 Big N audited 
observations, 1,101 Second-Tier audited observations, and 3,841 other non-Big N 
audited observations). Table 28 summarizes the derivation of the full and restricted 
samples.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (ABS_DD) are presented in 
Table 29 (for the full sample) and Table 30 (for the restricted sample). In Table 29 Panel 
A, I present descriptive statistics for the full sample by audit firm type, pooled over the 
entire sample period (1988-2006). In Table 29 Panel C, I present descriptive statistics for 
the full sample by audit firm type and time period. The results in Panel A indicate that 
Big N client accruals are of higher quality than Second-Tier client accruals (p = 0.000) 
and other non-Big N client accruals (p = 0.000). Second-Tier client accruals are of 
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higher quality than other non-Big N client accruals (p = 0.000). In Panel C, the results 
indicate that these relationships hold in both periods (pre- and post-Andersen). Results in 
Panel C also indicate that both Big N and Second-Tier client accruals quality improved 
pre- to post-Andersen (p = 0.000 and 0.021 respectively) while the other non-Big N 
client accruals quality deteriorated (p = 0.000). Descriptive results for the restricted 
sample are presented in Table 30 and are consistent with those reported for the full 
sample in Table 29.  
Descriptive statistics for the control variables in Model 4 are presented in Table 
31 (for the full sample) and Table 32 (for the restricted sample). In both tables, 
descriptive results for Big N, Second-Tier, and other non-Big N audit firm clients, are 
presented in Panels A, B, and C respectively. In Panel D, I compare the control variable 
means across audit firm types in each period (pre- and post-Andersen). The results in 
these two tables are similar so I focus my discussion on the results from the full sample 
(Table 31) and highlight any differences in the results from the restricted sample (Table 
32). With respect to firm size (lnASSETS), Big N clients are significantly larger than 
Second-Tier clients and Second-Tier clients are significantly larger than other non-Big N 
clients. These results hold in the pre- and post-Andersen period and the results indicate a 
significant pre- to post-Andersen increase in client size for each audit firm type. The 
length of the operating cycle (lnOPCYCLE) is significantly shorter and operating 
volatility (σREV, σCFO) is lower for Big N clients than for both Second-Tier and other 
non-Big N clients in both periods. Finally, the propensity of losses increased pre- to 
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post-Andersen for clients of each auditor type with Big N clients reporting significantly 
fewer losses than the other auditor types in each period. 
Multivariate Results 
 As discussed in the preceding section, the sample includes multiple observations 
for a given firm (client). To adjust for possible correlation of residuals within firm 
clusters, all regressions reported in this section employ survey regression techniques 
with observations clustered at the firm (client) level generating test statistics which are 
based on Roger‟s standard errors (White corrected). Results from estimations of Model 4 
are presented in Table 33 (for the full sample) and Table 34 (for the restricted sample). 
In Tables 33 and 34, Panel A (Panel B) presents results of the estimation of Model 4 
without (with) the inverse Mills ratio (INVMILLS) control for selection bias.. 
 Results from estimates of Model 4 (full sample) are presented in Table 33. In 
Panel A, the negative and significant coefficient on BIGN indicates that Big N clients 
have lower ABS_DD than other non-Big N clients in the pre-Andersen period (p = 
0.005). The insignificant coefficient on SEC_TIER indicates that there is no difference 
in ABS_DD for Second-Tier and other non-Big N clients in the pre-Andersen period. A 
joint test (BIGN = SEC_TIER) confirms that the pre-Andersen BIGN coefficient is 
significantly more negative than the pre-Andersen SEC_TIER coefficient (p = 0.009).  
 The interactions between the post-Andersen indicator variable (POST) and 
auditor type (BIGN and SEC_TIER) are both negative and significant (p = 0.000 and 
0.001 respectively) indicating a pre- to post-Andersen reduction in the magnitude of 
ABS_DD for Big N and Second-Tier clients, relative to other non-Big N clients. 
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Moreover, the joint tests for the post-Andersen effects (BIG N + POST*BIGN and 
SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) are both negative and significant (p = 0.000). These 
results indicate that ABS_DD is lower for both Big N and Second-Tier clients than for 
other non-Big N clients in the post-Andersen period. Finally, the joint test (BIGN + 
POST*BIGN = SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) contrasting the post-Andersen effect 
of Big N audit firm affiliation with that of Second-Tier audit firm affiliation is 
significant (p = 0.065) indicating that ABS_DD is lower Big N clients than for Second-
Tier clients in the post-Andersen period.  
 Results in Panel B are consistent with those reported in Panel A with two 
exceptions. Specifically, the coefficient on BIGN and the joint test (BIGN + 
POST*BIGN = SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) contrasting the post-Andersen effect 
of Big N audit firm affiliation with that of Second-Tier audit firm affiliation are both 
insignificant. These differences do not alter the tenor of the results which suggest an 
improvement in Second-Tier client accruals quality, relative to the client accruals quality 
of the other audit firm types. In both Panel A and Panel B, the results indicate a negative 
association between ABS_DD and lnASSETS and a positive association between 
ABS_DD and lnOPCYCLE, σREV, σCFO, and LOSS.    
 The results for the restricted sample, presented in Table 34, are generally 
consistent with those presented in Table 33 with two exceptions. First, in Panel A, the 
joint test (BIGN + POST*BIGN = SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) contrasting the 
post-Andersen effect of Big N audit firm affiliation with that of Second-Tier audit firm 
affiliation is insignificant. Second, in Panel B, the joint test (BIGN + POST*BIGN = 
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SEC_TIER + POST*SEC_TIER) contrasting the post-Andersen BIGN and SEC_TIER 
coefficient estimates is significant (p = 0.036) and suggests that Second-Tier client 
accruals quality is better than that for Big N clients..   
 Overall, the results in Tables 33 and 34 suggest a pre- to post-Andersen 
improvement in Second-Tier client accruals quality, relative to the client accruals quality 
of the other audit firm types (Big N and other non-Big N). A summary of the pre- to 
post-Anderson changes in the audit firm client accruals quality hierarchy is presented in 
Table 35. 
Summary 
 A summary of the results from Tables 33 and 34 is presented in Table 35. The 
results portray a consistent pattern which suggests a general improvement in Second-
Tier client accruals quality, relative to the client accruals quality of the other audit firm 
types (Big N and other non-Big N). Specifically, a comparison of the pre-Andersen 
coefficient estimates in Tables 33 and 34 (Panels A and B) indicates that Second-Tier 
client accruals quality was not distinct from that of other non-Big N clients in each of the 
four tests. That is, the pre-Andersen Second-Tier coefficient estimate was insignificant 
in each of the regressions presented in Tables 33 and 34 (Panels A and B). However, a 
comparison of the post-Andersen coefficient estimates indicates that Second-Tier client 
accruals quality was distinct from that of other non-Big N clients in each of the four 
tests. That is, the post-Andersen Second-Tier coefficient estimate was significant in each 
of the regressions presented in Tables 33 and 34 (Panels A and B).  
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 A comparison of the pre-Andersen joint tests (BIGN = SEC_TIER) contrasting 
the BIGN and SEC_TIER coefficient estimates indicates that Big N client accruals 
quality exceeded that of Second-Tier clients in three of the four tests.  However, post-
Andersen, the results indicate that Second-Tier client accruals quality was comparable to 
that of Big N clients in two of four tests and exceeded that of Big N clients in one test. In 
sum, the results provide evidence suggesting that Second-Tier audit firms have improved 
their position within the audit firm client accruals quality hierarchy and have 
distinguished themselves from other non-Big N audit firms. Moreover, the post-
Andersen results provide partial evidence suggesting that there is no difference in 
Second-Tier and Big N client accruals quality. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
I perform a number of sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of the results 
presented in the preceding section. First, I perform tests to assess the robustness of my 
results to alternative Second-Tier audit firm definitions. As discussed above, I construct 
two additional Second-Tier audit firm definitions (specifically, a three-firm Second-Tier, 
and a five-firm Second-Tier) where membership is based on the number of client-year 
observations available in my sample for a given audit firm. The results using these 
alternative Second-Tier audit firm definitions are presented in Table 36 (three-firm 
Second-Tier) and Table 37 (five-firm Second-Tier) and the tenor of the results is 
consistent with those reported in Tables 33 and 34. 
Second, I winzorize, rather than delete, outliers based on the distribution of the 
signed residual generated by estimating Model 3. The results of tests using this 
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alternative sample are presented in Table 38 and the tenor of the results is consistent 
with those presented in Tables 33 and 34.  
 The third set of sensitivity analyses was performed to alleviate potential concerns 
relating to the composition of the firms included in the Second-Tier over time. As 
discussed above, I examine the sensitivity of my results to the exclusion of the years 
preceding the establishment of a clear-cut three-firm Second-Tier. Results from these 
tests, using data from 1995 forward, are presented in Table 39 and the results are 
generally consistent with those presented in Tables 33 and 34.   
Finally, I perform tests to assess the robustness of my results to the method used 
to construct the firm-specific accruals quality estimate. As discussed previously, the 
primary accruals quality measure proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) is based on 
the standard deviation of firm-specific residuals (from Model 3) calculated over a rolling 
five year period. My primary tests employ an alternative accruals quality measure 
suggested by Dechow and Dichev (2002), calculated as the absolute value of the firm-
year specific residual estimated using Model 3 (ABS_DD).  
The results of tests using an aggregated (five-year) accruals quality measure are 
presented in Table 40. To ensure that auditor changes do not contaminate the accruals 
quality measure, I first exclude all firms which experienced an auditor change during the 
sample period. I then construct the aggregated accruals quality measure (σDD) and 
corresponding control variables for the remaining firms over the final five years in the 
pre-Andersen period (1996-2000) and the first five years in the post-Andersen period 
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(2001-2005). The final data set then includes one observation for each non-switching 
firm in each period.  
Results in Table 40 suggest that accruals quality was higher for Second-Tier 
clients than for other non-Big N clients in both periods. Moreover, the results indicate no 
difference in Big N and Second-Tier client accruals quality in either period. 
Consequently, the results are inconsistent with the results in Tables 33 and 34 in that 
they do not suggest a pre- to post-Andersen improvement in Second-Tier client accruals 
quality, relative to the client accruals quality of the other auditor types. However, the 
results do indicate that Second-Tier auditors outperform other non-Big N auditors and 
are comparable to Big N auditors in terms of client accruals quality in both periods.  
Likelihood of Manipulation 
Data 
All data used in this section are collected from COMPUSTAT. For reasons 
described above, the sample period begins in 1988 and I perform tests on two samples 
(i.e., the full sample and the restricted sample) comprised of observations from 1988 
through 2006. The pre-Andersen period is comprised of fiscal years 1988 through 2000 
and the post-Andersen period is comprised of fiscal years 2001-2006. For both samples, 
I delete firms incorporated in a foreign country, firms in regulated and financial 
industries (i.e., with SIC codes 4000 through 4999 and 6000 through 6999), firms with 
total assets less than $1 million (COMPUSTAT data item # 6), firms with missing 
COMPUSTAT data needed to estimate the Dechow et al. (2008) F-Score (Model 5), and 
firms with missing auditor information (COMPUSTAT data item #149). For each year, I 
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determine which observations are in the top or bottom 1 percent of the distribution of the 
F-Score and delete these observations to limit the influence of outliers on my results.
17
 
These procedures yield the full sample which consists of 74,832 company-year 
observations (59,056 Big N audited observations, 5,006 Second-Tier audited 
observations, and 10,770 other non-Big N audited observations).  
As described previously, I also perform tests on a restricted sample to address the 
potential selection bias associated with audit firm and/or client selection. I delete all 
observations for any company that switched audit firm types (e.g., from Big N to 
Second-Tier, from Second-Tier to other non-Big N, etc.) during the sample period. This 
procedure eliminates 23,107 company-year observations and yields a restricted sample 
comprised of 51,725 company-year observations (45,692 Big N audited observations, 
1,074 Second-Tier audited observations, and 4,959 other non-Big N audited 
observations). Table 41 summarizes the derivation of the full and restricted samples.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the F-Score are presented in Table 42 (for the full 
sample) and Table 43 (for the restricted sample). In Table 42 Panel A, I present 
descriptive statistics for the full sample by audit firm type, pooled over the entire sample 
period (1988-2006). In Table 42 Panel C, I present descriptive statistics for the full 
                                                 
17
 Dechow et al. (2008) report a high frequency of manipulating firms in the Computers (20.5%), Retail 
(12.9%), and Services (12.5%) industries.  To ensure that the F-Scores generated for the firms in my 
sample are reasonable, I compared Dechow et al.‟s (2008) reported distribution of manipulating firms (by 
industry) to the distribution of firms (by industry) in my sample with F-Scores in the top quartile of the 
distribution.  Results of this analysis indicate that the generated F-Scores appear reasonable.  Specifically, 
I find the following industry percentages of high F-Score firms:  Computers (23%), Retail (15%), Services 
(13%).  My results do indicate a higher proportion of firms in the Pharmaceuticals industry (14%) than 
that reported by Dechow et al. (2008) (2.9%).  
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sample by audit firm type and time period. Higher F-Scores are indicative of a higher 
probability of managerial manipulation. The results in Panel A indicate that Big N and 
Second-Tier client F-Scores are not significantly different while other non-Big N client 
F-Scores are significantly lower than both Big N and Second-Tier client F-Scores (p = 
0.000). In Panel C, the results indicate a pre- to post-Andersen reduction in Big N and 
Second-Tier client F-Scores (p = 0.000) and an increase in other non-Big N client F-
Scores (p = 0.000). Pre-Andersen, other non-Big N client F-Scores are significantly 
lower than both Big N and Second-Tier client F-Scores (p = 0.000). However, post-
Andersen, the results indicate that Big N clients have F-Scores which are lower than 
other non-Big N client F-Scores and that there is no difference in Second-Tier and other 
non-Big N client F-Scores.  
Results in Table 43 are consistent with those in Table 42 with two exceptions. 
First, results in Table 43 Panel C indicate that the pre- to post-Andersen change in 
Second-Tier client F-Scores is insignificant (p = 0.694), a result which was significant in 
Table 42. Second, results in Table 43 Panel C indicate that Big N client F-Scores were 
significantly lower than Second-Tier client F-Scores in the post-Andersen period, a 
result which was insignificant in Table 42. Figure 3 provides a graphical display of the 
univariate results presented in Tables 42 and 43.  
Portfolio Results 
As discussed in Chapter II, I also perform tests to compare pre- to post-Andersen 
changes in the composition of Second-Tier client portfolios to the changes observed in 
the client portfolios of the other auditor types. Specifically, I construct annual F-Score 
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deciles and compute the percentage of Big N, Second-Tier, and other non-Big N clients 
which fall into the two highest deciles (firms that are most likely to have a financial 
statement manipulation) in each of the pre- and post-Andersen periods. Results of this 
analysis are presented in Figure 4 Panel A for the full sample and Figure 4 Panel B for 
the restricted sample.  
 In Panel A, the results indicate that both Big N and Second-Tier auditors reduced 
the proportion of risky firms in their client portfolios post-Andersen. The proportion of 
risky firms in the other non-Big N client portfolio increased post Andersen. The results 
in Panel B are consistent with those in Panel A except that results indicate that Second-
Tier auditors increased the proportion of risky firms in their client portfolio post-
Andersen. 
Summary 
 Overall, the results of tests using the Dechow et al. (2008) F-Score as the 
earnings quality proxy yield mixed results. Results of tests using the full sample (Table 
42 and Figure 4 Panel A) support the tenor of the results described for the two other 
earnings quality proxies in that they suggest a pre- to post-Andersen improvement in 
Second-Tier client earnings quality, relative to the other auditor types. However, the 
results of tests using the restricted sample provide little support for the overall findings 
in the paper.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
I examine the association between earnings quality and audit firm affiliation 
using a three-tiered audit firm classification scheme which allows for an explicit 
examination of Second-Tier client earnings quality. My tests are motivated by the lack 
of competition in the market for audit services, theoretical arguments which suggest a 
positive association between audit firm size and audit quality, evidence pointing to the 
rapid post-Andersen growth in Second-Tier audit practices, and the lack of empirical 
research that fully differentiates audit firm type. Government agencies (i.e., United 
States Government Accountability Office, United States Department of the Treasury, 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) have expressed concern over the lack of 
competition in the market for audit services and have promoted the use of Second-Tier 
audit firms as an alternative to a Big N audit. My study aims to provide evidence about a 
group of audit firms which appear to be best situated to alleviate concerns about the state 
of competition in the market for audit services.  
 Despite the rapid growth of Second-Tier audit practices, relatively little research 
has been performed to examine the characteristics of audits performed by Second-Tier 
firms. To date, most research examining the association between various proxies for real 
and/or perceived audit quality and audit firm size uses a dichotomous classification 
scheme for the variable of interest (i.e., Big N versus non-Big N) so that Second-Tier 
audit firms are classified together with other non-Big N auditors. My study helps to fill 
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the void in the literature by examining the association between earnings quality and audit 
firm type using an audit firm classification scheme which differentiates between Second-
Tier and other non-Big N audit firms. Specifically, I examine the association between 
earnings quality and audit firm type using three earnings quality proxies which have 
been used in the prior literature to capture the magnitude and/or direction of 
opportunistic managerial manipulation of financial statements. I use a pre- versus post-
Andersen design, where the pre-Andersen period is comprised of fiscal years 1988 
through 2000, and the post-Andersen period is comprised of fiscal years 2001 through 
2006. 
 My results on the association between earnings quality and audit firm type 
indicate that the post-Andersen growth of Second-Tier audit firms coincides with an 
improvement in Second-Tier audit quality, relative to the other audit firm types (Big N 
and other non-Big N). Specifically, the results indicate that Second-Tier client earnings 
quality was generally not distinct from that of other non-Big N clients in the pre-
Andersen period. However, in the post-Andersen period, the results indicate that 
Second-Tier client earnings quality was higher than that of other non-Big N clients. 
Moreover, the post-Andersen results provide partial evidence suggesting that there is no 
difference in Second-Tier and Big N client earnings quality, and thus, lend some 
credence to the notion of a new era for the Big 8.  
 These results should convey important information to market participants (e.g., 
investors, underwriters, analysts, etc.) who wish to assess the extent to which financial 
statements are likely to be free from opportunistic managerial manipulation, to clients 
 
58 
that are contemplating switching to a Second-Tier audit firm, to government agencies 
who have expressed concern over the state of competition in the market for audit 
services, and to those who have promoted the use of Second-Tier audit firms in the wake 
of SOX-related resource constraints.  
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FIGURE 1 
Second-Tier Audit Firm Growth 1999-2007:  
Summary Factor Scores 
 
Panel A:  Factor Scores for Component 1 
 
 
Panel B:  Factor Scores for Component 2 
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FIGURE 2 
Second-Tier Audit Firm Growth 1999-2007: Factor Components 
 
Panel A:  Percent Change in Revenue 
 
 
Panel B:  Percent Change in Number of Professionals 
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FIGURE 2 (continued) 
 
Panel C:  Percent Change in Number of Offices 
 
 
Panel D:  Percent Change in Number of SEC Clients 
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FIGURE 3  
Dechow et al. (2008) F-Score Means By  
Auditor Type and Period  
 
Panel A:  Full Sample 
 
 
Panel B:  Restricted Sample 
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FIGURE 4  
Percentage of Audit Clients With F-Scores in the Two Highest  
F-Score Deciles, By Auditor Type and Period 
  
Panel A:  Full Sample 
 
 
Panel B:  Restricted Sample 
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TABLE 1  
Variable Definitions 
 
SIGN_DA =  Signed firm-specific discretionary accrual estimate, estimated using the 
following performance-adjusted modified Jones (1991) model: 
 
TAt/ASSETSt-1 =  α + β1 1/ASSETSt-1 + β2 (ΔSALESt-ΔARt)/ASSETSt-1  
+ β3 PPEt/ASSETSt-1 + β4 ROAt + et 
 
Where: 
TA = Total accruals (COMPUSTAT # 18 – COMPUSTAT # 308) 
ASSETS = Total assets (COMPUSTAT # 6) 
SALES = Total sales (COMPUSTAT # 12) 
AR = Accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT # 2) 
PPE = Property, plant, and equipment (COMPUSTAT # 7) 
ROA =  Return on assets (COMPUSTAT # 18 / COMPUSTAT # 6 
prior year) 
et  = Discretionary accruals 
 
ABS_DA =  Absolute value firm-specific discretionary accrual estimate, equal to the 
absolute value of SIGN_DA 
 
ABS_DD =  Absolute value firm-specific accruals quality estimate, estimated using 
the following modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model: 
  
  TCAt = α + β1OCFt-1 + β2OCFt + β3OCFt+1 + β4ΔREVt + β5PPEt + et  
 
Where: 
TCA = Total current accruals (ΔCOMPUSTAT # 4 
– ΔCOMPUSTAT # 1 - (ΔCOMPUSTAT # 5  
– ΔCOMPUSTAT # 34)), scaled by average total assets (COMPUSTAT 
# 6) 
OCF = Operating cash flow (COMPUSTAT # 308), scaled by average 
total assets (COMPUSTAT # 6) 
ΔREV = Change in revenues (COMPUSTAT #12), scaled by average 
total assets (COMPUSTAT # 6) 
PPE = Property, plant, and equipment (COMPUSTAT # 7), scaled by 
average total assets (COMPUSTAT # 6) 
et  = Accruals quality 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
σDD =  Alternative accruals quality measure calculated as the standard deviation 
of firm-specific residuals from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model over the current and previous four years.   
 
F-Score =  Firm-specific manipulation score estimate, calculated based on the 
following Model 1 coefficient estimates in Table 7 Panel A of Dechow 
et al. (2008): 
  
 LogitF-Score = -6.789 + 0.817(RSST) + 3.230(ΔAR) + 2.436(ΔINV)  
+ 0.122(ΔCASH_SALE) – 0.992(ΔEARNINGS)  
+ 0.972(ISSUE) 
 
Where: 
RSST = Richardson et al. (2006) accruals measure (ΔWC  
+ ΔNCO + ΔFIN)/average total assets; WC = (COMPUSTAT # 4 – 
COMPUSTAT #1) – (COMPUSTAT # 5  
– COMPUSTAT # 34); NCO = (COMPUSTAT # 6  
– COMPUSTAT # 4 – COMPUSTAT # 32) 
 – (COMPUSTAT # 181 – COMPUSTAT # 5  
– COMPUSTAT # 9); FIN = (COMPUSTAT # 193  
+ COMPUSTAT # 32) – (COMPUSTAT # 9  
+ COMPUSTAT # 34 + COMPUSTAT # 130) 
ΔAR = Change in accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT # 2), scaled by 
average total assets 
ΔINV = Change in inventory (COMPUSTAT # 3), scaled by average 
total assets 
ΔCASH_SALE = Percentage change in CASH_SALE;  CASH_SALE 
= COMPUSTAT # 12 -  ΔAR (unscaled) 
ΔEARNINGS = Change in EARNINGS; EARNINGS = 
COMPUSTAT # 18, scaled by average total assets 
ISSUE = An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm issued securities 
during the year; ISSUE = 1 if COMPUSTAT # 108 > 0 or 
 COMPUSTAT # 111 > 0 
F-Score = [exp(LogitF-Score)]/[1 + exp(LogitF-Score)], scaled by the 
unconditional probability of manipulation 0.00345. 
 
POST =  A dummy variable coded 1 if the observation is from 2001-2006, 0 
otherwise 
 
BIGN =  A dummy variable coded 1 if the client engages a Big N audit firm, 0 
otherwise 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
SEC_TIER  =  A dummy variable coded 1 if the client engages a Second-Tier audit 
firm where the Second-Tier definition is based on the primary set of 4 
firms, 0 otherwise 
 
SEC_TIER3 =  A dummy variable coded 1 if the client engages a Second-Tier audit 
firm where the Second-Tier definition is based on the alternative set of 3 
firms, 0 otherwise 
 
SEC_TIER5 =  A dummy variable coded 1 if the client engages a Second-Tier audit 
firm where the Second-Tier definition is based on the alternative set of 5 
firms, 0 otherwise 
 
lnASSETS =  The natural log of total assets (COMPUSTAT # 6) measured as of fiscal 
year-end 
 
lnAVG_ASSETS = The natural log of average assets (COMPUSTAT # 6), calculated 
over the current and previous four years 
 
CFO =  Cash flow from operations (COMPUSTAT # 308) scaled by lagged total 
assets 
 
ABS_TA =  The absolute value of total accruals (COMPUSTAT # 18 – 
COMPUSTAT # 308) scaled by lagged total assets 
 
LEV =  Ratio of total debt to total assets (COMPUSTAT # 9 / COMPUSTAT # 
6) 
 
AGE = The total number of years for which total assets was reported in 
COMPUSTAT 
 
TENURE =  The number of consecutive years that the firm has retained their current 
auditor 
 
σREV =  The standard deviation of sales (COMPUSTAT # 12) deflated by total 
assets over the current and prior four years 
 
σCFO =  The standard deviation of cash flow from operations (COMPUSTAT # 
308) deflated by total assets over the current and prior four years 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
lnOPCYCLE =  The natural log of OPCYCLE; OPCYCLE = (360 / (sales / average 
accounts receivable)) + (360 / (cost of goods sold / average inventory)); 
for firms in the business services industry,  
OPCYCLE = (360 / (sales / average accounts receivable)); sales = 
COMPUSTAT # 12; accounts receivable = COMPUSTAT # 2; cost of 
goods sold = COMPUSTAT # 41; inventory = COMPUSTAT # 3 
 
lnAVG_OPCYCLE = The natural log of average OPCYCLE, calculated over the current 
and previous four years 
 
LOSS =  A dummy variable coded 1 if net income (COMPUSTAT # 172) is less 
than zero, 0 otherwise 
 
LOSS_PROP =  The propensity of losses, calculated as the average of LOSS over the 
current and previous four years 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Construction – Discretionary Accruals 
   
Company-
year 
observations 
Total unique company (client)-year observations available from 
COMPUSTAT for the years 1988 through 2006 with non-missing and non-
negative assets (COMPUSTAT data item #6). 
        172,347  
Less: foreign firm observations   (17,767) 
Less: observations in regulated and financial industries (SIC codes in the 
4,000 and 6,000 series) 
        (44,209) 
Less: observations with total assets (COMPUSTAT data item #6) less than 
$1 million.  
        (5,292) 
Less: observations with missing COMPUSTAT data items needed to 
estimate the discretionary accruals model. 
  (11,102) 
Less: observations with missing or invalid auditor information 
(COMPUSTAT data item #149). 
           (416) 
Less: observations with missing COMPUSTAT data items needed to 
construct the variables included in the multivariate model.  
  (3,549) 
Less: outliers            (2,855) 
        
Full sample   87,157  
 
Less switching firms   (26,085) 
 
Restricted sample      61,072 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables (ABS_DA and SIGN_DA), Full Sample 
             
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for ABS_DA and SIGN_DA by Audit Firm Type, Pooled Across Both Periods 
             
  n  Mean  Q1  Median  Q3  Std. Dev. 
ABS_DA             
  Big N  69,890  0.115  0.028  0.063  0.132  0.176 
  Second-Tier  5,347  0.143  0.037  0.083  0.179  0.200 
  Other  11,920  0.173  0.041  0.098  0.208  0.250 
             
SIGN_DA             
  Big N  69,890  0.006  -0.067  -0.003  0.059  0.210 
  Second-Tier  5,347  0.007  -0.086  0.001  0.081  0.246 
  Other  11,920  -0.004  -0.107  -0.004  0.090  0.304 
             
Panel B: Univariate Tests 
 
    ABS_DA  SIGN_DA 
  T-Stat  P-Value  T-Stat  P-Value 
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -11.19  0.000  -0.33  0.738 
  Big N v. Other  -31.22  0.000  5.07  0.000 
  Second-Tier v. Other  -7.75  0.000  2.61  0.009 
             
(continued on next page) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
7
7
 
 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
             
Panel C: Mean ABS_DA and SIGN_DA by Audit Firm Type and Period 
             
    Pre-
Andersen 
 Post-
Andersen 
 
Change 
 
T-Stat 
 
P-Value 
ABS_DA             
  Big N    0.111  0.127  0.015  9.94  0.000 
  Second-Tier    0.141  0.146  0.005  0.89  0.373 
  Other    0.148  0.223  0.075  15.67  0.000 
             
SIGN_DA             
  Big N    0.011  -0.008  -0.020  -10.67  0.000 
  Second-Tier    0.013  -0.001  -0.014  -2.08  0.038 
  Other    -0.003  -0.008  -0.005  -0.79  0.431 
             
Panel D: Univariate Tests 
 
    ABS_DA  SIGN_DA 
  T-Stat  P-Value  T-Stat  P-Value 
Pre-Andersen         
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -10.45  0.000  -0.48  0.634 
  Big N v. Other  -18.77  0.000  6.09  0.000 
  Second-Tier v. Other  -1.76  0.079  3.36  0.001 
         
Pre-Andersen         
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -3.86  0.000  -1.16  0.247 
  Big N v. Other  -22.44  0.000  -0.06  0.955 
  Second-Tier v. Other  -9.26  0.000  0.67  0.506 
         
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. All tests are based on a comparison of the sample means and p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables (ABS_DA and SIGN_DA), Restricted Sample 
             
Panel A:   Descriptive Statistics for ABS_DA and SIGN_DA by Audit Firm Type, Pooled Across Both Periods 
             
  n  Mean  Q1  Median  Q3  Std. Dev. 
ABS_DA             
  Big N  54,245  0.112  0.026  0.060  0.126  0.178 
  Second-Tier  1,218  0.137  0.036  0.079  0.162  0.197 
  Other  5,609  0.181  0.042  0.101  0.224  0.258 
             
SIGN_DA             
  Big N  54,245  0.005  -0.065  -0.004  0.056  0.210 
  Second-Tier  1,218  0.013  -0.071  0.011  0.088  0.240 
  Other  5,609  -0.010  -0.115  -0.007  0.088  0.315 
             
Panel B: Univariate Tests 
 
    ABS_DA  SIGN_DA 
  T-Stat  P-Value  T-Stat  P-Value 
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -4.91  0.000  -1.34  0.181 
  Big N v. Other  -26.21  0.000  4.86  0.000 
  Second-Tier v. Other  -5.53  0.000  2.44  0.015 
             
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
             
Panel C:  Mean ABS_DA and SIGN_DA by Audit Firm Type and Period 
             
    Pre-
Andersen 
 Post-
Andersen 
 
Change 
 
T-Stat 
 
P-Value 
ABS_DA             
  Big N    0.107  0.125  0.018  10.50  0.000 
  Second-Tier    0.127  0.166  0.038  2.99  0.003 
  Other    0.150  0.245  0.095  13.11  0.000 
             
SIGN_DA             
  Big N    0.011  -0.010  -0.021  -10.29  0.000 
  Second-Tier    0.021  -0.009  -0.030  -1.94  0.053 
  Other    -0.009  -0.012  -0.003  -0.36  0.716 
             
Panel D: Univariate Tests 
 
    ABS_DA  SIGN_DA 
  T-Stat  P-Value  T-Stat  P-Value 
Pre-Andersen         
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -3.80  0.000  -1.64  0.101 
  Big N v. Other  -15.70  0.000  5.93  0.000 
  Second-Tier v. Other  -3.41  0.001  3.53  0.000 
         
Pre-Andersen         
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -3.14  0.002  -0.09  0.927 
  Big N v. Other  -19.72  0.000  0.26  0.797 
  Second-Tier v. Other  -3.75  0.000  0.12  0.902 
         
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. All tests are based on a comparison of the sample means and p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables by Audit Firm Type and Period, Full Sample 
                 
Panel A:  Big N (N = 69,890) 
       
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  4.697  4.590  1.986  5.656  5.631  1.913  55.67  0.000 
CFO  0.010  0.065  0.288  0.030  0.072  0.233  8.46  0.000 
ABS_TA  0.126  0.074  0.367  0.118  0.076  0.192  -2.81  0.005 
LEV  0.194  0.121  0.259  0.196  0.104  0.286  0.70  0.481 
AGE  14.088  9.000  12.355  16.668  11.000  13.874  23.13  0.000 
TENURE  5.713  5.000  3.606  7.708  6.000  5.557  54.57  0.000 
σREV  0.269  0.169  0.779  0.231  0.151  0.354  -6.18  0.000 
σCFO  0.105  0.056  0.414  0.112  0.059  0.289  2.12  0.034 
                 
Panel B:  Second-Tier (N = 5,347) 
                 
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  3.065  2.906  1.484  3.738  3.683  1.586  15.72  0.000 
CFO  -0.055  0.019  0.347  -0.021  0.038  0.297  3.72  0.000 
ABS_TA  0.160  0.096  0.247  0.159  0.090  0.297  -0.06  0.953 
LEV  0.196  0.082  1.092  0.177  0.051  0.338  -0.78  0.438 
AGE  11.613  9.000  8.916  15.750  13.000  10.263  15.57  0.000 
TENURE  3.875  3.000  2.686  3.932  3.000  3.623  0.65  0.513 
σREV  0.356  0.240  0.417  0.319  0.207  0.436  -3.10  0.002 
σCFO  0.150  0.085  0.624  0.161  0.088  0.342  0.69  0.493 
                 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
                 
Panel C: Other (N = 11,920) 
       
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  2.295  2.052  1.443  2.369  2.245  1.344  2.70  0.007 
CFO  -0.079  0.001  0.337  -0.155  -0.024  0.472  -10.11  0.000 
ABS_TA  0.178  0.097  0.358  0.315  0.124  0.787  13.09  0.000 
LEV  0.160  0.066  0.259  0.175  0.031  0.382  2.47  0.013 
AGE  11.164  9.000  8.406  13.451  11.000  9.780  13.27  0.000 
TENURE  4.686  4.000  3.343  5.208  3.000  4.764  6.95  0.000 
σREV  0.382  0.220  1.691  0.469  0.228  1.234  2.93  0.003 
σCFO  0.171  0.081  0.684  0.583  0.125  4.252  8.40  0.000 
                 
Panel D: Univariate Tests 
                 
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen 
 
Variable 
 Big N  
v. Second-Tier 
 Big N  
v. Other 
 Second-Tier  
v. Other 
 Big N  
v. Second-Tier 
 Big N  
v. Other 
 Second-Tier  
v. Other 
lnASSETS  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
CFO  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
ABS_TA  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
LEV    ***  ***  ***  ***   
AGE  ***  ***  **  ***  ***  *** 
TENURE  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
σREV  ***  ***    ***  ***  *** 
σCFO  ***  ***    ***  ***  *** 
                 
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. All tests are based on a comparison of the sample means and p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables by Audit Firm Type and Period, Restricted Sample 
                 
Panel A:  Big N (N = 54,245) 
       
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  5.069  4.978  1.919  5.924  5.892  1.823  46.25  0.000 
CFO  0.022  0.073  0.283  0.037  0.077  0.230  5.72  0.000 
ABS_TA  0.122  0.071  0.405  0.113  0.074  0.176  -2.71  0.007 
LEV  0.203  0.133  0.269  0.203  0.116  0.294  0.05  0.957 
AGE  14.276  9.000  12.951  16.492  11.000  14.285  17.06  0.000 
TENURE  5.958  5.000  3.649  7.858  6.000  5.647  45.67  0.000 
σREV  0.255  0.158  0.859  0.222  0.144  0.361  -4.48  0.000 
σCFO  0.096  0.051  0.383  0.105  0.056  0.288  2.56  0.010 
                 
Panel B:  Second-Tier (N = 1,218) 
                 
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  3.413  3.287  1.597  4.366  4.270  1.993  8.55  0.000 
CFO  -0.051  0.029  0.377  -0.056  0.040  0.348  -0.19  0.848 
ABS_TA  0.149  0.085  0.231  0.148  0.084  0.224  -0.05  0.957 
LEV  0.289  0.126  2.045  0.183  0.095  0.246  -0.92  0.358 
AGE  10.881  7.000  10.099  10.981  8.000  9.711  0.15  0.878 
TENURE  4.780  4.000  2.967  8.107  8.000  4.872  14.31  0.000 
σREV  0.343  0.221  0.420  0.300  0.188  0.470  -1.51  0.131 
σCFO  0.125  0.073  0.189  0.194  0.081  0.194  2.86  0.004 
                 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
                 
Panel C: Other (N = 5,609) 
       
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  2.035  1.851  1.243  2.167  2.041  1.307  3.65  0.000 
CFO  -0.092  -0.006  0.352  -0.210  -0.042  0.545  -9.69  0.000 
ABS_TA  0.185  0.101  0.360  0.396  0.150  0.839  13.12  0.000 
LEV  0.149  0.054  0.228  0.161  0.020  0.332  1.67  0.094 
AGE  10.571  8.000  8.233  9.618  6.000  8.657  -3.99  0.000 
TENURE  5.776  5.000  3.619  7.168  5.000  5.492  11.31  0.000 
σREV  0.389  0.210  1.314  0.527  0.206  1.706  3.32  0.001 
σCFO  0.160  0.084  0.446  0.719  0.133  4.429  7.71  0.000 
                 
Panel D: Univariate Tests 
                 
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen 
 
Variable 
 Big N  
v. Second-Tier 
 Big N  
v. Other 
 Second-Tier  
v. Other 
 Big N  
v. Second-Tier 
 Big N  
v. Other 
 Second-Tier  
v. Other 
lnASSETS  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
CFO  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
ABS_TA  **  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
LEV  ***  ***  ***    ***   
AGE  ***  ***    ***  ***  ** 
TENURE  ***  ***  ***    ***  *** 
σREV  ***  ***    ***  ***  ** 
σCFO  **  ***  **  ***  ***  ** 
                 
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. All tests are based on a comparison of the sample means and p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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TABLE 7 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Absolute Value Discretionary Accruals (ABS_DA), Full Sample 
             
ABS_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER  
+ β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS + β7CFO + β8ABS_TA  
+ β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
 
    Panel A  Panel B 
 
Variable 
 Exp.  
Sign 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
Intercept  ?  0.162  0.000  0.132  0.000 
POST  ?  0.041  0.000  0.031  0.000 
BIGN  -  -0.014  0.000  -0.011  0.000 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.026  0.000  -0.021  0.000 
SEC_TIER  ?  0.000  0.915  0.002  0.618 
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.036  0.000  -0.033  0.000 
lnASSETS  ?  -0.001  0.012  0.003  0.003 
CFO  ?  -0.163  0.000  -0.163  0.000 
ABS_TA  ?  0.072  0.000  0.070  0.000 
LEV  ?  -0.005  0.217  -0.006  0.113 
AGE  ?  -0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
TENURE  ?  0.000  0.335  0.001  0.003 
σREV  ?  0.005  0.066  0.005  0.066 
σCFO  ?  0.004  0.158  0.003  0.212 
INVMILLS  ?      0.028  0.000 
           
β2 + β3 = 0  -    0.000    0.000 
β4 + β5 = 0  -    0.000    0.000 
β2 = β4  -    0.000    0.000 
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    0.398    0.816 
           
N    87,157    87,157   
R2    0.214    0.214   
           
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1.   P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a 
prediction is (is not) made.  A summary of the results in this table is presented in Table 13. 
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TABLE 8 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Absolute Value Discretionary Accruals (ABS_DA), Restricted Sample 
             
ABS_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER  
+ β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS + β7CFO + β8ABS_TA  
+ β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
 
    Panel A  Panel B 
 
Variable 
 Exp.  
Sign 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
Intercept  ?  0.146  0.000  0.128  0.000 
POST  ?  0.046  0.000  0.040  0.000 
BIGN  -  -0.019  0.000  -0.016  0.000 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.030  0.001  -0.027  0.002 
SEC_TIER  ?  -0.008  0.200  -0.007  0.316 
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.016  0.184  -0.014  0.220 
lnASSETS  ?  0.000  0.884  0.002  0.027 
CFO  ?  -0.172  0.000  -0.173  0.000 
ABS_TA  ?  0.059  0.002  0.058  0.003 
LEV  ?  -0.003  0.458  -0.004  0.350 
AGE  ?  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
TENURE  ?  0.000  0.369  0.000  0.064 
σREV  ?  0.005  0.139  0.005  0.140 
σCFO  ?  0.003  0.432  0.002  0.486 
INVMILLS  ?      0.018  0.025 
           
β2 + β3 = 0  -    0.000    0.000 
β4 + β5 = 0  -    0.072    0.112 
β2 = β4  -    0.032    0.045 
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    0.094    0.118 
           
N    61,072    61,072   
R2    0.217    0.217   
           
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1.   P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a 
prediction is (is not) made.  A summary of the results in this table is presented in Table 13. 
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TABLE 9 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Positive Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Full Sample 
             
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER  
+ β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS + β7CFO + β8ABS_TA  
+ β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
 
    Panel A  Panel B 
 
Variable 
 Exp.  
Sign 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
Intercept  ?  0.100  0.000  0.133  0.000 
POST  ?  0.027  0.000  0.039  0.000 
BIGN  -  -0.010  0.001  -0.012  0.000 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.024  0.002  -0.029  0.000 
SEC_TIER  ?  0.006  0.191  0.005  0.323 
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.030  0.003  -0.033  0.001 
lnASSETS  ?  0.007  0.000  0.003  0.035 
CFO  ?  -0.260  0.000  -0.260  0.000 
ABS_TA  ?  0.061  0.060  0.062  0.056 
LEV  ?  -0.003  0.486  -0.001  0.735 
AGE  ?  -0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.388 
TENURE  ?  -0.000  0.278  -0.001  0.009 
σREV  ?  0.007  0.047  0.007  0.049 
σCFO  ?  0.002  0.543  0.002  0.452 
INVMILLS  ?      -0.032  0.000 
           
β2 + β3 = 0  -    0.000    0.000 
β4 + β5 = 0  -    0.006    0.002 
β2 = β4  -    0.000    0.000 
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    0.195    0.080 
           
N    42,587    42,587   
           
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1.   P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a 
prediction is (is not) made.  A summary of the results in this table is presented in Table 13. 
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TABLE 10 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Positive Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Restricted Sample 
             
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER  
+ β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS + β7CFO + β8ABS_TA  
+ β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
 
    Panel A  Panel B 
 
Variable 
 Exp.  
Sign 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
Intercept  ?  0.087  0.000  0.132  0.000 
POST  ?  0.029  0.007  0.044  0.000 
BIGN  -  -0.012  0.003  -0.018  0.000 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.024  0.034  -0.031  0.006 
SEC_TIER  ?  0.004  0.570  0.000  0.952 
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.032  0.051  -0.037  0.029 
lnASSETS  ?  0.008  0.000  0.003  0.063 
CFO  ?  -0.268  0.000  -0.268  0.000 
ABS_TA  ?  0.049  0.151  0.051  0.141 
LEV  ?  -0.002  0.686  0.000  0.941 
AGE  ?  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.205 
TENURE  ?  -0.000  0.638  -0.001  0.038 
σREV  ?  0.010  0.010  0.011  0.009 
σCFO  ?  0.005  0.464  0.006  0.382 
INVMILLS  ?      -0.046  0.000 
           
β2 + β3 = 0  -    0.000    0.000 
β4 + β5 = 0  -    0.069    0.024 
β2 = β4  -    0.009    0.005 
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    0.568    0.414 
           
N    29,426    29,426   
           
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1.   P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a 
prediction is (is not) made.  A summary of the results in this table is presented in Table 13. 
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TABLE 11 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Negative Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Full Sample 
             
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER  
+ β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS + β7CFO + β8ABS_TA  
+ β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
 
    Panel A  Panel B 
 
Variable 
 Exp.  
Sign 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
Intercept  ?  -0.200  0.000  -0.117  0.000 
POST  ?  -0.057  0.000  -0.028  0.001 
BIGN  +  0.019  0.000  0.011  0.000 
POST*BIGN  ?  0.028  0.000  0.014  0.110 
SEC_TIER  ?  0.009  0.082  0.004  0.394 
POST*SEC_TIER  +  0.037  0.001  0.029  0.005 
lnASSETS  ?  0.009  0.000  -0.002  0.059 
CFO  ?  -0.002  0.886  -0.001  0.922 
ABS_TA  ?  -0.084  0.000  -0.080  0.001 
LEV  ?  0.001  0.723  0.004  0.275 
AGE  ?  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000 
TENURE  ?  -0.001  0.006  -0.002  0.000 
σREV  ?  -0.003  0.378  -0.003  0.398 
σCFO  ?  -0.004  0.326  -0.003  0.472 
INVMILLS  ?      -0.077  0.000 
           
β2 + β3 = 0  +    0.000    0.000 
β4 + β5 = 0  +    0.000    0.000 
β2 = β4  +    0.010    0.040 
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    0.841    0.271 
           
N    44,570    44,570   
           
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1.   P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a 
prediction is (is not) made.  A summary of the results in this table is presented in Table 13. 
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TABLE 12 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Negative Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Restricted Sample 
             
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER  
+ β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS + β7CFO + β8ABS_TA  
+ β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
 
    Panel A  Panel B 
 
Variable 
 Exp.  
Sign 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
Intercept  ?  -0.182  0.000  -0.110  0.000 
POST  ?  -0.067  0.000  -0.044  0.001 
BIGN  +  0.029  0.000  0.017  0.000 
POST*BIGN  ?  0.038  0.004  0.026  0.052 
SEC_TIER  ?  0.022  0.008  0.015  0.066 
POST*SEC_TIER  +  -0.003  0.543  -0.013  0.674 
lnASSETS  ?  0.007  0.000  -0.001  0.327 
CFO  ?  -0.002  0.894  -0.003  0.888 
ABS_TA  ?  -0.074  0.004  -0.070  0.006 
LEV  ?  -0.001  0.861  0.001  0.871 
AGE  ?  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000 
TENURE  ?  -0.001  0.033  -0.001  0.000 
σREV  ?  -0.002  0.340  -0.002  0.350 
σCFO  ?  -0.002  0.457  -0.001  0.694 
INVMILLS  ?      -0.069  0.000 
           
β2 + β3 = 0  +    0.000    0.000 
β4 + β5 = 0  +    0.268    0.477 
β2 = β4  +    0.197    0.415 
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    0.087    0.142 
           
N    31,646    31,646   
           
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1.   P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a 
prediction is (is not) made.  A summary of the results in this table is presented in Table 13. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
9
0
 
 
TABLE 13 
Summary of Findings in Tables 7 - 12 
                
Panel A:  Full Sample 
     ABS_DA 
Table 7 
 SIGN_DA (Pos) 
Table 9 
 SIGN_DA (Neg) 
Table 11 
     Panel A  Panel B  Panel A  Panel B  Panel A  Panel B 
Second-Tier Firms Distinct From Other non-
Big N Firms? 
           
    Pre-Andersen No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
    Post-Andersen Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Second-Tier Firms Comparable to Big N 
Firms? 
           
    Pre-Andersen No  No  No  No  No  No 
    Post-Andersen Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Improvement in Second-Tier Position Pre to 
Post-Andersen? 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
            
Panel B:  Restricted Sample            
     ABS_DA 
Table 8 
 SIGN_DA (Pos) 
Table 10 
 SIGN_DA (Neg) 
Table 12 
     Panel A  Panel B  Panel A  Panel B  Panel A  Panel B 
Second-Tier Firms Distinct From Other non-
Big N Firms? 
           
    Pre-Andersen No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
    Post-Andersen Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Second-Tier Firms Comparable to Big N 
Firms? 
           
    Pre-Andersen No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
    Post-Andersen No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Improvement in Second-Tier Position Pre to 
Post-Andersen? 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
No 
  
No 
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TABLE 14 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Absolute Value Discretionary Accruals (ABS_DA), Three-Firm Second-Tier 
              
ABS_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER3 + β5POST*SEC_TIER3 + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.014 *** -0.011 ***  -0.019 *** -0.016 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.026 *** -0.021 ***  -0.030 *** -0.027 *** 
SEC_TIER3  ?  0.001  0.002   -0.008  -0.007  
POST*SEC_TIER3  -  -0.035 *** -0.033 ***  -0.016  -0.014  
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  ***   *    
β2 = β4  -  ***  ***   **  *  
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?       *    
             
N    87,157  87,157   61,072  61,072  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 15 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Positive Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Three-Firm Second-Tier 
              
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER3 + β5POST*SEC_TIER3 + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.010 *** -0.012 ***  -0.012 *** -0.018 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.024 *** -0.029 ***  -0.024 ** -0.031 *** 
SEC_TIER3  ?  0.006  0.005   0.004  0.000  
POST*SEC_TIER3  -  -0.030 *** -0.033 ***  -0.032 * -0.037 ** 
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  ***   *  **  
β2 = β4  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    *       
             
N    42,587  42,587   29,426  29,426  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 16 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Negative Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Three-Firm Second-Tier 
              
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER3 + β5POST*SEC_TIER3 + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  +  0.019 *** 0.011 ***  0.028 *** 0.017 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  0.028 *** 0.013   0.038 *** 0.025 * 
SEC_TIER3  ?  0.008 * 0.004   0.022 *** 0.015 * 
POST*SEC_TIER3  +  0.036 *** 0.027 ***  -0.006  -0.016  
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  +  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  +  ***  ***       
β2 = β4  +  ***  **       
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?       *    
             
N    44,570  44,570   31,646  31,646  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 17 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Absolute Value Discretionary Accruals (ABS_DA), Five-Firm Second-Tier 
              
ABS_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER5 + β5POST*SEC_TIER5 + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.014 *** -0.012 ***  -0.019 *** -0.016 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.026 *** -0.021 ***  -0.030 *** -0.027 *** 
SEC_TIER5  ?  -0.002  -0.000   -0.007  -0.006  
POST*SEC_TIER5  -  -0.033 *** -0.031 ***  -0.016  -0.013  
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  ***   *    
β2 = β4  -  ***  ***   **  **  
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?       *  *  
             
N    87,157  87,157   61,072  61,072  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 18 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Positive Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Five-Firm Second-Tier 
              
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER5 + β5POST*SEC_TIER5 + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.011 *** -0.013 ***  -0.012 *** -0.017 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.023 *** -0.029 ***  -0.025 ** -0.032 *** 
SEC_TIER5  ?  0.004  0.002   0.006  0.003  
POST*SEC_TIER5  -  -0.027 *** -0.030 ***  -0.033 ** -0.038 ** 
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  ***   *  **  
β2 = β4  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    *       
             
N    42,587  42,587   29,426  29,426  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 19 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Negative Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Five-Firm Second-Tier 
              
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER5 + β5POST*SEC_TIER5 + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  +  0.019 *** 0.012 ***  0.029 *** 0.017 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  0.028 *** 0.013   0.037 *** 0.025 * 
SEC_TIER5  ?  0.010 ** 0.006   0.022 *** 0.015 * 
POST*SEC_TIER5  +  0.034 *** 0.026 ***  -0.005  -0.014  
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  +  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  +  ***  ***       
β2 = β4  +  **  *       
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?       *  *  
             
N    44,570  44,570   31,646  31,646  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 20 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Absolute Value Discretionary Accruals (ABS_DA), Winzorize Outliers 
              
ABS_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER + β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.020 *** -0.016 ***  -0.026 *** -0.020 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.054 *** -0.044 ***  -0.066 *** -0.058 *** 
SEC_TIER  ?  -0.006  -0.003   -0.016 ** -0.012  
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.056 *** -0.051 ***  -0.060 *** -0.054 *** 
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β2 = β4  -  ***  ***   *    
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?           
             
N    90,012  90,012   62,502  62,502  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 21 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Positive Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Winzorize Outliers 
              
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER + β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.015 *** -0.017 ***  -0.021 *** -0.026 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.032 *** -0.038 ***  -0.029 * -0.037 ** 
SEC_TIER  ?  0.005  0.004   -0.001  -0.005  
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.035 ** -0.037 ***  -0.072 *** -0.077 *** 
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  **  ***   ***  ***  
β2 = β4  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    *       
             
N    43,832  43,832   29,996  29,996  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 22 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Negative Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Winzorize Outliers 
              
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER + β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  +  0.024 *** 0.014 ***  0.032 *** 0.016 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  0.076 *** 0.055 ***  0.108 *** 0.089 *** 
SEC_TIER  ?  0.016 ** 0.010   0.027 ** 0.016  
POST*SEC_TIER  +  0.076 *** 0.064 ***  0.048 * 0.033  
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  +  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  +  ***  ***   **  *  
β2 = β4  +  *         
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?       **  *  
             
N    46,180  46,180   32,506  32,506  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 23 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Absolute Value Discretionary Accruals (ABS_DA), Post-1994 
              
ABS_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER + β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.024 *** -0.022 ***  -0.032 *** -0.030 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.016 *** -0.010   -0.023 ** -0.019 ** 
SEC_TIER  ?  -0.012 ** -0.011 *  -0.023 ** -0.022 ** 
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.025 *** -0.022 ***  -0.001  0.002  
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  ***   *    
β2 = β4  -  ***  ***       
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?       **  **  
             
N    57,170  57,170   39,975  39,975  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 24 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Positive Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Post-1994 
              
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER + β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.021 *** -0.022 ***  -0.022 *** -0.026 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.018 ** -0.023 ***  -0.026 ** -0.035 *** 
SEC_TIER  ?  -0.003  -0.003   -0.002  -0.005  
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.026 ** -0.028 **  -0.029 * -0.035 * 
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  ***   **  **  
β2 = β4  -  ***  ***   **  **  
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?           
             
N    27,826  27,826   19,104  19,104  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 25 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Negative Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Post-1994 
              
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER + β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  +  0.033 *** 0.025 ***  0.048 *** 0.036 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  0.012  -0.006   0.020  0.002  
SEC_TIER  ?  0.026 *** 0.021 ***  0.051 *** 0.042 *** 
POST*SEC_TIER  +  0.019 * 0.008   -0.038  -0.050  
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  +  ***  **   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  +  ***  ***       
β2 = β4  +           
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?       **  *  
             
N    29,344  29,344   20,871  20,871  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 26 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Positive Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Exclude Hribar and Nichols (2007) Control Variables 
              
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER + β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.011 *** -0.013 ***  -0.013 *** -0.018 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.025 *** -0.030 ***  -0.027 ** -0.034 *** 
SEC_TIER  ?  0.006  0.005   0.004  0.000  
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.031 *** -0.034 ***  -0.034 ** -0.039 ** 
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  ***   *  **  
β2 = β4  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    *       
             
N    42,587  42,587   29,426  29,426  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 27 
The Association Between Earnings Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Negative Discretionary Accruals (SIGN_DA), Exclude Hribar and Nichols (2007) Control Variables 
              
SIGN_DA = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER + β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7CFO + β8ABS_TA + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11TENURE + β12 σ
REV
  + β13 σ
CFO
 + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  +  0.018 *** 0.011 ***  0.028 *** 0.016 *** 
POST*BIGN  ?  0.030 *** 0.014 *  0.039 *** 0.026 ** 
SEC_TIER  ?  0.009 * 0.004   0.022 *** 0.015 * 
POST*SEC_TIER  +  0.039 *** 0.030 ***  -0.002  -0.013  
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  +  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  +  ***  ***       
β2 = β4  +  **  *       
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?       *    
             
N    44,570  44,570   31,646  31,646  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 28 
Sample Construction – Dechow and Dichev (2002) Accruals 
 
   
Company-
year 
observations 
Total unique company (client)-year observations available from 
COMPUSTAT for the years 1988 through 2006 with non-missing and non-
negative assets (COMPUSTAT data item #6). 
        172,347  
Less: foreign firm observations   (17,767) 
Less: observations in regulated and financial industries (SIC codes in the 
4,000 and 6,000 series) 
        (44,209) 
Less: observations with total assets (COMPUSTAT data item #6) less than 
$1 million.  
        (5,292) 
Less: observations with missing COMPUSTAT data items needed to 
estimate the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals model. 
  (30,286) 
Less: observations with missing or invalid auditor information 
(COMPUSTAT data item #149). 
           (184) 
Less: observations with missing COMPUSTAT data items needed to 
construct the variables included in the multivariate model.  
  (8,351) 
Less: outliers           (1,306) 
        
Full sample   64,952  
 
Less switching firms   (16,573) 
 
Restricted sample      48,379 
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TABLE 29 
Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variable (ABS_DD), Full Sample 
             
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for ABS_DD by Audit Firm Type, Pooled Across Both Periods 
             
  n  Mean  Q1  Median  Q3  Std. Dev. 
  Big N  53,162  0.059  0.017  0.037  0.076  0.065 
  Second-Tier  4,097  0.080  0.023  0.054  0.106  0.081 
  Other  7,693  0.093  0.027  0.062  0.125  0.093 
             
Panel B: Univariate Tests 
 
  T-Stat  P-Value     
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -19.13  0.000     
  Big N v. Other  -40.07  0.000     
  Second-Tier v. Other  -7.71  0.000     
             
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 29 (continued) 
             
Panel C: Mean ABS_DD by Audit Firm Type and Period 
             
    Pre-
Andersen 
 Post-
Andersen 
 
Change 
 
T-Stat 
 
P-Value 
  Big N    0.061  0.052  -0.009  -14.05  0.000 
  Second-Tier    0.082  0.076  -0.006  -2.30  0.021 
  Other    0.089  0.101  0.012  5.28  0.000 
             
Panel D: Univariate Tests 
 
  T-Stat  P-Value     
Pre-Andersen         
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -14.98  0.000     
  Big N v. Other  -26.69  0.000     
  Second-Tier v. Other  -3.40  0.001     
         
Pre-Andersen         
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -13.94  0.000     
  Big N v. Other  -33.02  0.000     
  Second-Tier v. Other  -8.13  0.000     
         
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. All tests are based on a comparison of the sample means and p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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TABLE 30 
Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variable (ABS_DD), Restricted Sample 
             
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for ABS_DD by Audit Firm Type, Pooled Across Both Periods 
             
  n  Mean  Q1  Median  Q3  Std. Dev. 
  Big N  43,437  0.055  0.016  0.035  0.071  0.062 
  Second-Tier  1,101  0.074  0.022  0.052  0.099  0.073 
  Other  3,841  0.093  0.027  0.061  0.123  0.092 
             
Panel B: Univariate Tests 
 
  T-Stat  P-Value     
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -9.76  0.000     
  Big N v. Other  -34.27  0.000     
  Second-Tier v. Other  -6.24  0.000     
             
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 30 (continued) 
             
Panel C: Mean ABS_DD by Audit Firm Type and Period 
             
    Pre-
Andersen 
 Post-
Andersen 
 
Change 
 
T-Stat 
 
P-Value 
  Big N    0.057  0.049  -0.008  -11.97  0.000 
  Second-Tier    0.077  0.062  -0.015  -2.91  0.004 
  Other    0.087  0.105  0.018  5.71  0.000 
             
Panel D: Univariate Tests 
 
  T-Stat  P-Value     
Pre-Andersen         
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -9.00  0.000     
  Big N v. Other  -22.23  0.000     
  Second-Tier v. Other  -2.83  0.005     
         
Pre-Andersen         
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -3.63  0.000     
  Big N v. Other  -29.33  0.000     
  Second-Tier v. Other  -6.49  0.000     
         
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. All tests are based on a comparison of the sample means and p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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TABLE 31 
Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables by Audit Firm Type and Period, Full Sample 
                 
Panel A:  Big N (N = 53,162) 
       
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  4.767  4.644  1.946  5.747  5.719  1.885  50.61  0.000 
lnOPCYCLE  4.699  4.771  0.776  4.601  4.680  0.796  -12.51  0.000 
σREV  0.336  0.236  0.712  0.315  0.228  0.364  -3.32  0.001 
σCFO  0.113  0.064  0.384  0.137  0.070  0.620  5.16  0.000 
LOSS  0.333  0.000  0.471  0.391  0.000  0.488  12.11  0.000 
                 
Panel B:  Second-Tier (N = 4,097) 
                 
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  3.125  3.000  1.484  3.711  3.642  1.556  12.00  0.000 
lnOPCYCLE  4.784  4.890  0.810  4.707  4.770  0.841  -2.93  0.003 
σREV  0.438  0.313  0.438  0.435  0.298  0.470  -0.23  0.820 
σCFO  0.170  0.096  0.717  0.228  0.111  0.949  2.20  0.028 
LOSS  0.420  0.000  0.494  0.518  1.000  0.500  6.09  0.000 
                 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 31 (continued) 
                 
Panel C: Other (N = 7,693) 
       
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  2.310  2.100  1.360  2.487  2.370  1.346  5.42  0.000 
lnOPCYCLE  4.817  4.870  0.987  4.782  4.787  1.036  -1.44  0.149 
σREV  0.473  0.316  1.160  0.616  0.349  1.825  4.17  0.000 
σCFO  0.213  0.102  0.786  0.675  0.142  5.229  6.16  0.000 
LOSS  0.474  0.000  0.499  0.563  1.000  0.496  7.41  0.000 
                 
Panel D: Univariate Tests 
                 
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen 
 
Variable 
 Big N  
v. Second-Tier 
 Big N v. Other  Second-Tier v. 
Other 
 Big N  
v. Second-Tier 
 Big N  
v. Other 
 Second-Tier  
v. Other 
lnASSETS  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
lnOPCYCLE  ***  ***    ***  ***  ** 
σREV  ***  ***    ***  ***  *** 
σCFO  ***  ***  **  ***  ***  *** 
LOSS  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
                 
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. All tests are based on a comparison of the sample means and p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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TABLE 32 
Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables by Audit Firm Type and Period, Restricted Sample 
                 
Panel A:  Big N (N = 43,437) 
       
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  5.099  5.001  1.878  6.017  5.970  1.783  45.17  0.000 
lnOPCYCLE  4.681  4.757  0.763  4.586  4.660  0.794  -11.24  0.000 
σREV  0.318  0.219  0.763  0.303  0.219  0.369  -2.10  0.036 
σCFO  0.105  0.059  0.408  0.120  0.065  0.384  3.43  0.001 
LOSS  0.306  0.000  0.461  0.366  0.000  0.482  11.56  0.000 
                 
Panel B:  Second-Tier (N = 1,101) 
                 
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  3.396  3.228  1.557  4.233  3.990  1.960  7.12  0.000 
lnOPCYCLE  4.776  4.860  0.789  4.780  4.800  0.852  0.07  0.943 
σREV  0.438  0.310  0.434  0.376  0.260  0.344  -2.13  0.033 
σCFO  0.135  0.085  0.156  0.253  0.105  0.863  3.77  0.000 
LOSS  0.389  0.000  0.488  0.511  1.000  0.501  3.54  0.000 
                 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 32 (continued) 
 
                 
Panel C: Other (N = 3,841) 
       
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen   Change 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  T-Stat  P-Value 
lnASSETS  2.180  2.010  1.297  2.356  2.219  1.383  3.83  0.000 
lnOPCYCLE  4.797  4.870  1.068  4.784  4.787  1.103  -0.33  0.740 
σREV  0.492  0.305  1.555  0.629  0.306  1.390  2.63  0.009 
σCFO  0.186  0.100  0.486  1.062  0.149  7.551  5.91  0.000 
LOSS  0.481  0.000  0.500  0.560  1.000  0.497  4.55  0.000 
                 
Panel D: Univariate Tests 
                 
  Pre-Andersen   Post-Andersen 
 
Variable 
 Big N  
v. Second-Tier 
 Big N v. Other  Second-Tier v. 
Other 
 Big N  
v. Second-Tier 
 Big N  
v. Other 
 Second-Tier  
v. Other 
lnASSETS  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
lnOPCYCLE  ***  ***    ***  ***   
σREV  ***  ***    ***  ***  *** 
σCFO  **  ***  ***  ***  ***  * 
LOSS  ***  ***  ***  ***  ***   
                 
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. All tests are based on a comparison of the sample means and p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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TABLE 33 
The Association Between Accruals Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Modified Dechow and Dichev 2002 Model of Accrual Quality, Full Sample 
             
ABS_DD = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER  
+ β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS + β7lnOPCYCLE + β8 σ
REV
  
+ β9 σ
CFO
 + β10LOSS + є 
 
    Panel A  Panel B 
 
Variable 
 Exp  
Sign 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
Intercept  ?  0.080  0.000  0.054  0.000 
POST  ?  0.010  0.000  -0.001  0.725 
BIGN  -  -0.004  0.005  -0.002  0.178 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.012  0.000  -0.007  0.008 
SEC_TIER  ?  0.000  0.939  0.002  0.308 
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.013  0.001  -0.010  0.006 
lnASSETS  ?  -0.008  0.000  -0.004  0.000 
lnOPCYCLE  ?  0.007  0.000  0.006  0.000 
σREV  ?  0.006  0.019  0.005  0.030 
σCFO  ?  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.010 
LOSS  ?  0.014  0.000  0.015  0.000 
INVMILLS  ?      0.029  0.000 
           
β2 + β3 = 0  -    0.000    0.000 
β4 + β5 = 0  -    0.000    0.012 
β2 = β4  -    0.009    0.021 
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    0.065    0.594 
           
N    64,952    64,952   
R2    0.135    0.138   
           
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1.   P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a 
prediction is (is not) made.  A summary of the results in this table is presented in Table 35. 
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TABLE 34 
The Association Between Accruals Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Modified Dechow and Dichev 2002 Model of Accrual Quality, Restricted 
Sample 
             
ABS_DD = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER  
+ β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS + β7lnOPCYCLE + β8 σ
REV
  
+ β9 σ
CFO
 + β10LOSS + є 
 
    Panel A  Panel B 
 
Variable 
 Exp  
Sign 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
  
Estimate 
  
P-Value 
Intercept  ?  0.082  0.000  0.055  0.000 
POST  ?  0.016  0.000  0.004  0.326 
BIGN  -  -0.004  0.042  0.002  0.789 
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.018  0.000  -0.011  0.003 
SEC_TIER  ?  0.001  0.815  0.005  0.207 
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.026  0.000  -0.022  0.000 
lnASSETS  ?  -0.007  0.000  -0.004  0.000 
lnOPCYCLE  ?  0.007  0.000  0.006  0.000 
σREV  ?  0.006  0.038  0.006  0.051 
σCFO  ?  0.001  0.005  0.001  0.126 
LOSS  ?  0.014  0.000  0.015  0.000 
INVMILLS  ?      0.032  0.000 
           
β2 + β3 = 0  -    0.000    0.006 
β4 + β5 = 0  -    0.000    0.000 
β2 = β4  -    0.081    0.176 
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    0.379    0.036 
           
N    48,379    48,379   
R2    0.134    0.138   
           
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1.   P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a 
prediction is (is not) made.  A summary of the results in this table is presented in Table 35. 
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TABLE 35 
Summary of Findings in Tables 33-34 
                
       Full Sample 
Table 33 
 Restricted Sample 
Table 34 
         Panel A  Panel B  Panel A  Panel B 
Second-Tier Firms Distinct From Other non-Big N Firms?         
    Pre-Andersen     No  No  No  No 
    Post-Andersen     Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Second-Tier Firms Comparable to Big N Firms? 
        
    Pre-Andersen     No  No  No  Yes 
    Post-Andersen     No  Yes  Yes  Better 
 
Improvement in Second-Tier Position Pre to Post-Andersen? 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
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TABLE 36 
The Association Between Accruals Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Modified Dechow and Dichev 2002 Model of Accrual Quality, Three-Firm  
Second-Tier 
              
ABS_DD = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER3 + β5POST*SEC_TIER3 + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7lnOPCYCLE + β8 σ
REV
 + β9 σ
CFO
 + β10LOSS + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.004 *** -0.001   -0.004 ** 0.002  
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.012 *** -0.007 ***  -0.018 *** -0.011 *** 
SEC_TIER3  ?  0.000  0.003   0.001  0.005  
POST*SEC_TIER3  -  -0.012 *** -0.009 ***  -0.026 *** -0.022 *** 
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  **   ***  ***  
β2 = β4  -  ***  **   *    
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?  *       **  
             
N    64,952  64,952   48,379  48,379  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 37 
The Association Between Accruals Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Modified Dechow and Dichev 2002 Model of Accrual Quality, Five-Firm  
Second-Tier 
              
ABS_DD = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER5 + β5POST*SEC_TIER5 + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7lnOPCYCLE + β8 σ
REV
 + β9 σ
CFO
 + β10LOSS + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.004 *** -0.001   -0.003 * 0.002  
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.013 *** -0.008 ***  -0.019 *** -0.012 *** 
SEC_TIER5  ?  0.002  0.004 *  0.002  0.006  
POST*SEC_TIER5  -  -0.015 *** -0.012 ***  -0.028 *** -0.024 *** 
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β2 = β4  -  ***  ***   **    
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?  *       **  
             
N    64,952  64,952   48,379  48,379  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 38 
The Association Between Accruals Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Modified Dechow and Dichev 2002 Model of Accrual Quality, Winzorize Outliers 
              
ABS_DD = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER + β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7lnOPCYCLE + β8 σ
REV
 + β9 σ
CFO
 + β10LOSS + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.007 *** -0.002   -0.006 *** 0.002  
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.017 *** -0.009 ***  -0.024 *** -0.013 *** 
SEC_TIER  ?  -0.002  0.001   -0.003  0.003  
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.015 *** -0.010 **  -0.030 *** -0.024 *** 
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  ***   ***  ***  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  **   ***  ***  
β2 = β4  -  **  *       
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?  **         
             
N    66,257  66,257   49,256  49,256  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 39 
The Association Between Accruals Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation: 
Modified Dechow and Dichev 2002 Model of Accrual Quality, Post-1994 
              
ABS_DD = α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER + β5POST*SEC_TIER + β6lnASSETS  
+ β7lnOPCYCLE + β8 σ
REV
 + β9 σ
CFO
 + β10LOSS + є 
  
    Panel A: Full Sample  Panel B: Restricted Sample 
Variable  Exp. Sign  Estimate  Estimate   Estimate  Estimate  
BIGN  -  -0.006 *** -0.003   -0.003  0.003  
POST*BIGN  ?  -0.009 *** -0.002   -0.017 *** -0.008 ** 
SEC_TIER  ?  -0.002  0.001   -0.001  0.003  
POST*SEC_TIER  -  -0.009 ** -0.005 *  -0.023 *** -0.018 *** 
INVMILLS  ?  No  Yes   No  Yes  
             
β2 + β3 = 0  -  ***  **   ***  *  
β4 + β5 = 0  -  ***  *   ***  ***  
β2 = β4  -  **  *       
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?         **  
             
N    43,766  43,766   32,202  32,202  
             
 
Selected coefficient estimates are presented.  All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is (is not) made. 
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TABLE 40 
The Association Between Accruals Quality and Audit Firm Affiliation:  
Modified Dechow and Dichev 2002 Model of Accrual Quality, Five-Year Aggregated 
Accruals Quality Estimates 
         
σDD= α + β1POST + β2BIGN + β3POST*BIGN + β4SEC_TIER + β5POST*SEC_TIER  
+ β6lnAVG_ASSETS + β7lnAVG_OPCYCLE + β8 σ
REV
 + β9 σ
CFO
  
+ β10LOSS_PROP + є  
         
  Exp.  
Variable  Sign Estimate    
Intercept  ? 
0.055 ***   
POST  ? 
0.004    
BIGN  - 
-0.010 ***   
POST*BIGN  ? 
-0.009 *   
SEC_TIER  ? 
-0.012 *   
POST*SEC_TIER  - 
-0.002    
lnAVG_ASSETS  ? 
-0.002 ***   
lnAVG_OPCYCLE  ? 
0.004 ***   
σREV  ? 
0.020 ***   
σCFO  ? 
0.135 ***   
LOSS_PROP  ? 
0.011 ***   
      
β2 + β3 = 0  - ***   
β4 + β5 = 0  - **   
β2 = β4  -    
β2 + β3 = β4 + β5  ?    
      
N   
 
4,609  
R2    0.252  
      
      
Notes: All variables are as defined in Table 1.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels respectively.  P-values are based on one (two)-tailed tests when a prediction is  
(is not) made. 
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TABLE 41 
Sample Construction – Dechow et al. (2008) F-Score 
   
Company-year 
observations 
Total unique company (client)-year observations available from 
COMPUSTAT for the years 1988 through 2006 with non-missing 
and non-negative assets (COMPUSTAT data item #6). 
        172,347  
Less: foreign firm observations   (17,767) 
Less: observations in regulated and financial industries (SIC codes in 
the 4,000 and 6,000 series) 
        (44,209) 
Less: observations with total assets (COMPUSTAT data item #6) 
less than $1 million.  
        (5,292) 
Less: observations with missing COMPUSTAT data items needed to 
estimate the Dechow et al. (2008) F-Score. 
  (28,313) 
Less: observations with missing or invalid auditor information 
(COMPUSTAT data item #149). 
           (408) 
Less: outliers           (1,526) 
        
Full sample   74,832  
 
Less switching firms   (23,107) 
 
Restricted sample      51,725 
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Table 42 
Descriptive Statistics for the Dechow et al. (2008) F-Score, Full Sample 
             
Panel A:   Descriptive Statistics for F-Score by Audit Firm Type, Pooled Across Both Periods 
             
  n  Mean  Q1  Median  Q3  Std. Dev. 
  Big N  59,056  1.046  0.725  0.927  1.169  0.727 
  Second-Tier  5,006  1.049  0.578  0.891  1.200  0.854 
  Other  10,770  0.976  0.396  0.816  1.152  0.891 
             
Panel B: Univariate Tests 
 
  T-Stat  P-Value     
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -0.24  0.813     
  Big N v. Other  8.94  0.000     
  Second-Tier v. Other  4.87  0.000     
         
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 42 (continued) 
 
             
Panel C:  Mean F-Score by Audit Firm Type and Period 
             
    Pre-
Andersen 
 Post-
Andersen 
 
Change 
 
T-Stat 
 
P-Value 
  Big N    1.075  0.975  -0.100  -15.16  0.000 
  Second-Tier    1.091  0.997  -0.094  -3.86  0.000 
  Other    0.951  1.015  0.064  3.62  0.000 
             
Panel D: Univariate Tests 
 
  T-Stat  P-Value     
Pre-Andersen  -0.99  0.322     
  Big N v. Second-Tier  11.89  0.000     
  Big N v. Other  7.07  0.000     
  Second-Tier v. Other         
         
Pre-Andersen         
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -1.57  0.116     
  Big N v. Other  -3.42  0.001     
  Second-Tier v. Other  -0.77  0.441     
         
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. All tests are based on a comparison of the sample means and p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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Table 43 
Descriptive Statistics for the Dechow et al. (2008) F-Score, Restricted Sample 
             
Panel A:   Descriptive Statistics for F-Score by Audit Firm Type, Pooled Across Both Periods 
             
  n  Mean  Q1  Median  Q3  Std. Dev. 
  Big N  45,692  1.055  0.760  0.936  1.170  0.700 
  Second-Tier  1,074  1.132  0.637  0.934  1.299  0.960 
  Other  4,959  0.980  0.383  0.799  1.150  0.921 
             
Panel B: Univariate Tests 
 
  T-Stat  P-Value     
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -3.54  0.000     
  Big N v. Other  6.94  0.000     
  Second-Tier v. Other  4.88  0.000     
         
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 43 (continued) 
 
             
Panel C:  Mean F-Score by Audit Firm Type and Period 
             
    Pre-
Andersen 
 Post-
Andersen 
 
Change 
 
T-Stat 
 
P-Value 
  Big N    1.085  0.986  -0.099  -14.00  0.000 
  Second-Tier    1.141  1.117  -0.024  -0.39  0.694 
  Other    0.908  1.107  0.198  7.32  0.000 
             
Panel D: Univariate Tests 
 
  T-Stat  P-Value     
Pre-Andersen         
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -1.90  0.057     
  Big N v. Other  12.52  0.000     
  Second-Tier v. Other  6.38  0.000     
         
Pre-Andersen         
  Big N v. Second-Tier  -4.43  0.000     
  Big N v. Other  -7.56  0.000     
  Second-Tier v. Other  0.18  0.859     
         
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. All tests are based on a comparison of the sample means and p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
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